COMMENTS
Killing Jim Crow and the Undead Nondelegation

Doctrine with Privately Enforceable Federal Regulations
Brian J. Sutherland
Many of the ugly pages of American history have been obscured
and forgotten ....

America owes a debt of justice which it has only

begun to pay. If it loses the will to finish or slackens in its determination, history will recall its crimes and the country that would be
great will lack the most indispensable element of greatness-justice.
-Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.1
I. INTRODUCTION

Jim Crow is not dead.2 Though the decades since the Civil Rights
Movement have seen a deep change in the conscience of this country and
t J.D. summa cum laude, Seattle University School of Law, 2006. B.A. cum laude, University of
Washington, 2003. The author would like to sincerely thank his primary and managing editors,
Timothy Jones and Lee Kuo, for their patience and persistence; the staff of the Seattle University
Law Review, especially Catherine Le Vuong and Vanessa Firnhaber-Baker, for their understanding
and assistance; Professor Joaquin G. Avila for his inspiration and support; and all those who remind
us that true leadership lies in the service of others.
1. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE: CHAOS OR COMMUNITY? 109

(1967).
2. The name "Jim Crow," which appears to have originated as the pejorative reference to a
black man in a minstrel song written by Thomas Dartmouth Rice in the early nineteenth century, was
subsequently used to describe the segregation laws, rules, and customs that arose after Reconstruction ended in 1877 and continued until the mid-1960s. FERRIS STATE UNIVERSITY MUSEUM OF
RACIST MEMORABILIA, WHO WAS JIM CROW?, available at http://www.ferris.edu/news/jimcrow/

who.htm. Demonstrations and protests during the civil rights movement produced many memorable
scenes, one of which was captured early on at the NAACP Detroit Branch's "Parade for Victory" in
=
1944, available at http://www.jimcrowhistory.org/scripts/j imcrow/gallery.cgi?term=&collection
crow&index=54 (last visited May 3, 2006). The image portrays parade participants dressed as pallbearers and they carry a casket with a banner above which reads "Here Lies Jim Crow." Id.
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much progress has been made toward eliminating racial discrimination,
Jim Crow still lurks throughout American society. 3 These days, however,
while he no longer strides invincibly in the armor of apartheid, the law
still furnishes his means and serves his ends. Racial discrimination now
occurs primarily through the disproportionate distribution of the costs

and benefits of infrastructure, 4 industry,5 and community development,6
and institutional administration.7 Such disproportionate distribution favors affluent, predominantly white communities over communities of
color primarily because the latter are less able to challenge the legal
processes that authorize such inequitable development. 8 The inability to

3. See generally, e.g., Christian Halliburton, Neither SeparateNor Equal: How Race-Sensitive
Enforcement of Criminal Laws Threatens to Undo Brown v. Board of Education, 3 SEATTLE J. FOR
SOC. JUST. 45 (2004):
... [T]he separate but equal doctrine and its vampire-like ethos simply refused to die
with the mighty blow struck by Brown. Instead, this doctrine is now lurking more subtly
in the shadows of nominally colorblind legal norms that perpetuate the differential treatment of blacks and other communities of color, which constitutes a modem incursion
against the very victory whose anniversary we now celebrate.
Id. at 46.
4. See, e.g., ROBERT D. BULLARD, THE ANATOMY OF TRANSPORTATION RACISM, IN HIGHWAY

ROBBERY: TRANSPORTATION RACISM & NEW ROUTES TO EQUITY (2004) (Bullard, Johnson, &
Torres, eds.); DISCRIMINATION AMERICAN STYLE 85-138 (2d. ed. 1978).) (Joe R. Feagin & Clairece

Booher Feagin, eds.).
5. See Lisa Stiffler, Pollution Sites are not Evenly Distributed,Toxic Burden for Poor, Minorities and EPA Looks Set to Ease Remedy Efforts, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 26, 2005, at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/238143_envirojustice26.html.
Stiffler exposes the fact that
throughout Seattle metropolitan area, exposure to the use and production of large amounts of toxic
chemicals occurs predominantly in minority communities of low income. Id. Indeed, disproportionate imposition of the costs of toxic industrial development spurred the movement for "environmental
justice." See Melissa A. Hoffer, Closing the Door on Private Enforcement of Title VI and EPA 's
Discriminatory Effects Regulations: Strategies for Environmental Justice Stakeholders After
Sandoval and Gonzaga, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 971, 972-85 (2004).
6. See BULLARD, supra note 4, at 105-06 (discussing racially discriminatory effects of highway construction programs).
7. See infra Section II.A.; People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., School Dist. No. 205,
851 F. Supp. 905, 915-33 (N.D. 111.1994) rev'd in part on other grounds, Ill F.3d 528 (7th Cir.
1997) (finding that school board created and maintained a racially segregated school system through
various means including the manipulation of attendance zones, the provision of inequitable transportation and access to transportation to students based upon their race and national origin, and the
disparate placement of facilities and equipment so as to burden minority students and not provide
them with an equal educational opportunity).
8. See ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY (1994); see also ROBERT D. BULLARD, DECISION MAKING, ENVIRONMENT (May 1994),
reprinted in FACES OF ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: CONFRONTING ISSUES OF GLOBAL JUSTICE at 3,

16 (Laura Westra & Peter S. Wentz eds., 1995) ("few poor or minority communities have the resources to hire lawyers, expert witnesses, and doctors needed to sustain [a challenge to pollutioncausing industrial development that disproportionately impacts communities of color]"). Though
Bullard's work focuses on a specific subset of the theory of institutional racism that has been termed
"environmental racism," see Hoffer, supra note 5, his analysis applies as well to the more generalized theory of institutional racism set forth in this Comment.

2006]

Killing Jim Crow & the UndeadNondelegationDoctrine

919

effectively challenge such institutional injustice results from lack of access to legal representation and the lack of legal bases upon which to
mount such challenges. 9 In this manner the law still stands as a tool of
racial injustice, insofar as it authorizes the acts of those who perpetrate
discrimination. This is the face of racism today. Jim Crow lives, though
his crimes are now committed in a more complex, institutional mode.
A prime example of this phenomenon can be found in the recent
development plan for a sorely needed mass transit system in and around
Seattle, Washington. The local transit authority, Sound Transit, is building a light-rail system to serve the greater Puget Sound area,' 0 but because of the irregular topography of Seattle, developing a construction
plan has been a difficult task."' Sound Transit decided to build the rail
underground through tunnels in some neighborhoods, elevated above
ground in other neighborhoods, and at street-level in others.' 2 To the
south of Seattle lies Rainier Valley, a community composed predominantly of persons of color.' 3 Rainier Valley is one of those neighborhoods through which the light-rail is being built at street-level, at an
overwhelmingly disproportionate cost to its residents.' 4 This shocking
9. See infra Section I.
10. SOUND TRANSIT, LINK LIGHT RAIL PROJECTS, at http://www.soundtransit.org/projects/svc/

link/ (last visited May 4, 2006).
11. See King County Executive Ron Sims, Address to the Northwest Regional Conference of
the American Underground Construction Ass'n (Mar. 19, 2001), available at http://www.metrokc.
gov/exec/speeches/031901 .htm.
12. See Alex Fryer, A Milestone for Light Rail-Regional Board Selects Station Sites, Alignment, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 19, 1999.
13. Kate Davis, Housing Segregation in Seattle, An Update of a Study and Dataon Segregated
Housing in Seattle, Seattle Human Rights Department, 1976, at 30-31 (2005), http://evans.
washington.edu/research/psclinic/pd f/04-05/davis final.pdf.
14. Sound Transit's estimates of the significant unavoidable adverse impacts reveal a troubling
inequality of impact. See I SOUND TRANSIT, CENTRAL LINK LIGHT RAIL TRANSPORTATION
PROJECT, SEATTLE, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT [hereinafter FEIS] S-33-34
(1999). The light rail is broken up into six segments, A through F. Id. at S-3. Segment A will serve
North Seattle, a predominantly white area, and will displace between two and ten residences, businesses, and organizations. See id at S-33. Segment B, which also serves a predominantly white part
of Seattle, will displace between four and twenty residences, businesses, and organizations. See id.
Segment C, which also serves an area in which whites are a majority, will also displace between four
and twenty residences, businesses, and organizations. See id Segment E, which serves an area that is
also predominantly white, will displace between five and sixteen residences, businesses, and organizations. See id. at S-34. Segment F, which serves a less predominantly white area but in which
whites are still a majority, will displace between fourteen and fifty-three residences. See id at S-34.
Segment D, which is the predominantly African-American and minority portion of the Greater Seattle Area, will suffer displacement of between 62 and 191 businesses, residences, and organizations.
See id S-33-34. Sound Transit's preferred route alignment would result in at most thirteen property
acquisitions in Segment A, eight property acquisitions in Segment B, twenty-four property acquisitions in Segment C, ninety property acquisitions in Segment E, fifty-one property acquisitions in
Segment F, and 240 property acquisitions in Segment D. Id. at 4-38. Sound Transit's FEIS Addendum of 2001 disclosed a modification to the plan for Segment D that reduced the number of property
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disparity prompted George Curtis, a member of the Save Our Valley organization, 15 to denounce Sound Transit's administration of the project
as an "epic of ongoing deceit and institutional racism." 16 Save Our Valley's subsequent unsuccessful legal challenge to the Sound Transit project' 7 highlights both the reality of institutional racism and the inade18
quacy of current tools to challenge it in the courts.
Institutional racism, a conceptually distinct form of racial discrimination, seems to have surfaced first in the terminology of activists
Kwame Toure1 9 and Charles Hamilton. In the influential book Black
Power: The Politics of Liberation, Toure and Hamiliton contrasted institutional racism with the more familiar individual racism as being "less
overt, but far more subtle, less identifiable in terms of specific individuals committing the act[s] . . .that are destructive of human life., 20 Another noted scholar defined institutional racism in two stripes: "direct
institutionalized discrimination" consisting of "organizationally prescribed or community-prescribed actions which have an intentionally
differential and negative impact on members of subordinate groups," and
"indirect institutionalized discrimination" consisting of the same type of
practices which, "though organizationally prescribed, are carried out
without prejudice or intent to discriminate.'
Institutional racism must
also be understood more broadly, as articulated by another pair of pioacquisitions by seventeen and increased the number of partial acquisitions by sixty. FEIS Addendum
at 17. Sound Transit also estimated a disproportionate number of businesses and employees would
be displaced in Segment D. See FEIS at 4-19.
15. Save Our Valley is a community organization that was formed for the purpose of resisting
the construction of the light rail segment at ground-level through Rainier Valley. See David Shaefer,
Rainier Valley Residents Want Transit Tunnel, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 16, 1998.
16. George Curtis, Public Comment Letter on the Sound Transit Initial Segment Environmental
Assessment I (Mar. 7, 2001), available at www.globaltelematics.com/pitf/SeattleLightRailProjectSaveOurValleyComments.pdf.
17. Save our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2003).
18. See infra Parts Il1, IV.
19. Kwame Toure was the name taken by Stokely Carmichael in the 1970s. When he was
known as Stokely Carmichael, he was an extremely influential activist who popularized the terms
"Black Power" and "Black is Beautiful." He served as the Prime Minister of the Black Panther Party
and Chairman of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. STOKELY CARMICHAEL, THE
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., PAPERS PROJECT AT STANFORD UNIVERSITY, available at http://www.
stanford.edu/group/King/about king/encyclopedia/carmichaelstokely.html (on file with author).
20. STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF
LIBERATION 4 (Vintage Books 1967).
21. DISCRIMINATION AMERICAN STYLE, supra note 4, at 30-32. Joe. R. Feagin, editor, is currently the Ella McFadden Professor of Liberal Arts in the Department of Sociology at Texas A&M
University, has authored or co-authored over forty books and 100 articles, was a Scholar-inResidence for the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, and has received countless other honors and
awards for his research and scholarship in the field of race and gender relations. See Joe Feagin's
Homepage, Curriculum Vitae, available at http://sociology.tamu.edu/feagin (last visited May 24,
2006).
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neering theorists, Louis Knoules and Kenneth Prewitt. 22 They stressed
that it must be recognized as a historical phenomenon, "embedded in
American society," and defined it pithily as a "network of institutional
controls through which social benefits are allocated. 2 3
This Comment employs a definition that is perhaps more narrow in
theoretical and sociological scope, but more comprehensive in terms of
its description of effects. Institutional racism is racial discrimination perpetrated whether intentionally or not within the policies, practices, procedures, laws, rules, or regulations of any public or private institution. It
is the legacy of American slavery and a lingering obstacle to true racial
equality in this country.
Institutional racism is a very difficult problem to solve. It is much
more complex and more difficult to identify than conventional racial discrimination, 24 and for this reason it is "more dangerous-harder to combat and easier to ignore. 2 5 A primary reason for this difference is that
while only intentional discrimination is currently prohibited by the U.S.
Constitution,26 institutional racism often occurs without intent, or without
satisfactory proof of intent, by operation of seemingly benign policies,
procedures, and practices that cause the same devastating results of discrimination, segregation, and inequality of opportunity. 27 Moreover, although some such policies and procedures have been identified as discriminatory and prohibited by law,28 these prohibitions too often fail to
22. Louis KNOULES & KENNETH PREWITT, INSTITUTIONAL RACISM IN AMERICA 1-14 (1969).
23. Id. at 13-14.
24. Id.
25. Brothers and Sisters to Us, U.S. Catholic Bishops Pastoral Letter on Racism (1979) available at http://www.osjspm.org/cst/racism.htm.
26. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976); see infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
27. See FEAGIN, supra note 4, at 26-27. Though this Comment suggests ways in which private
enforcement of disparate impact regulations can and should be used to remedy institutional racism, it
does not address the merits of the debate over whether the constitutional standard should remain one
of intentionality, or should contemplate disparate impact as well, though this is an important and
well-considered issue. See generally Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle,90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976) (arguing, in the wake of Davis, that the constitutional standard
should not contemplate disparate impact); Charles R. Lawrence, Ill, The Id, Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (arguing that the constitutional standard should be construed to prohibit disparate impact because of the psychological realities that underlie the interaction of groups and individuals); Donald E. Lively & Steven Pass, Equal
Protection: The Jurisprudenceof Denial and Evasion, 40 AMER. L. REV. 1307 (1991) (arguing that
the intentionality requirement has denied, evaded, and accommodated racism and racial discrimination); Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 701
(2006); (discussing disparate impact theory and arguing that it failed to produce much meaningful
change and at the same time limited the jurisprudential conception of intentional discrimination in an
undesirable way).
28. See infra Part II.C (discussing federal regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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protect the victims of discrimination because they cannot be privately
enforced, and the government officials charged with enforcing them are
29
either unable or unwilling to do so.
This Comment has two goals. First, it seeks to contextualize, within
the reality of institutional racism, the debate over the private enforceability of federal regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.30 On the one hand, the
regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
196431 already include many provisions which effectively confront the
vestiges of racially discriminatory law and policy. 32 The logical inference
is that these perfectly proscriptive federal regulations ought to be enforceable, through private lawsuits if necessary, in order to enjoin and
deter such policy and procedure. 33 On the other hand, federal administrative agencies have the ability to attend to the complex social, political,
and economic factors perpetuating systematic racial discrimination, and
this is a compelling reason to recognize and encourage such activity on
their part in the future.
The second aim of this Comment is to contribute to the developing
discourse by proposing a more sound approach to the legal question of
whether agencies can exercise their delegated authority to create rights
that are privately enforceable under § 1983. Split decisions in the circuit

29. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for
Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 107-13 (2005). Professor Stephenson explains the many disadvantages of public enforcement by administrative agencies, including limited budgets which render agencies incapable of acting to enforce regulatory standards or
effectively monitor institutional actors for noncompliance, as well as the tendency of political pressure to result in "excessively lax" enforcement by the agency. Id. Moreover, even where a complaint
procedure exists by which minority citizens can inform the government of violations, there may be a
problem in minority citizens' access to knowledge of how to utilize the procedure. See, e.g., SOUND
TRANSIT, TITLE VI COMPLIANCE REVIEW OF THE CENTRAL PUGET SOUND

REGIONAL TRANSIT

3738 (2005) (discussing Sound Transit's deficiency in complying with requirements under Title VI that
the procedure for filing Title VI discrimination complaints be communicated and made available to
the public), availableat www.fta.dot.gov/documents/SoundTransitFinalReport.doc.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the primary vehicle for redressing civil rights violations in the federal
courts; it is the symbol for "the commitment of our society to be governed by law and to protect the
rights of those without power against oppression at the hands of the powerful." The Honorable
AUTHORITY, FINAL REPORT PREPARED FOR THE FEDERAL TRANSPORTATION ADMINISTRATION

Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the Statute

Remain Alive or Fade Away? 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 28 (1985). It provides a cause of action for the
deprivation of rights "secured by the Constitution and laws." See infra Part II.A.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d ("No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.").
32. See infra Part II.C.

33. Indeed, the importance of the rights created by the Title VI regulations, combined with the
ineffectiveness of the Title VI administrative complaint procedure, has already prompted at least one
commentator to argue for their private enforceability. See Bradford C. Mank, Using § 1983 to Enforce Title VI's Section 602 Regulations, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 321, 360-80 (2001).
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courts 34 and two United States Supreme Court cases not squarely ad-

dressing the issue but nonetheless suggesting the answer 35 have begun to
produce a small body of competent scholarship.36 However, not only has
most of this commentary failed to contextualize the legal issue with respect to racial justice and equal protection, 37 the legal arguments for refusing to recognize agencies' power to create individually enforceable
rights are untenable. The primary doctrinal justification 38 relies on a theory of the nondelegation doctrine 39 that is marked by remarkable obsolescence-such a narrow view of legislative delegation "flies in the face
of seventy years of administrative law.,, 40 A refusal to recognize agencies' power to create privately enforceable rights serves little purpose but
to maintain a withering and unworkable framework for addressing exercises of delegated authority, while at the same time risking the loss of a
very effective tool in confronting institutional racism. It also represents a
34. Cf Save our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2003), S.Camden Citizens in
Action v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Pro., 274 F.3d 771 (3d. Cir. 2001), Banks v. Dallas Hous.
Auth., 271 F.3d 605 (5th Cir. 2001), Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993 (11 th Cir. 1997), and Smith v.
Kirk, 821 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1987) with Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn 33 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 1994)
and Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
35. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
36. See, e.g., John A. McBrine, The Selective Use of Administrative Regulations in Creating
Rights Enforceable Through § 1983 Actions, 46 B.C. L. REV. 183 (2004); David McKennett, Who
Can Create Your Rights? On Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit and the Inability ofFederal Agencies to Create Personal Rights, And the Implications on the Nondelegation Doctrine, 15 GEO.
MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 179 (2004); Brian D. Galle, Can FederalAgencies Authorize Private Suits
Under Section 1983? A TheoreticalApproach, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 163 (2003); Charles Davant, IV,
Sorcerer or Sorcerer's Apprentice?: FederalAgencies and the Creation of Individual Rights, 2003
WIS. L. REV. 613 (2003); Recent Cases: Federal Courts-Civil Rights Litigation-Ninth Circuit
Holds That an Administrative Regulation Can Never Create an Individual FederalRight Enforceable Through §1983, 117 HARV. L. REV. 735 (2003). Indeed, the topic appears to be getting hotter,
as relevant commentary continued to be published during the editing phase of this Comment. See,
e.g., Branford C. Mank, Can Administrative Regulations Interpret Rights Enforceable Under Section
1983?: Why Chevron Deference Survives Sandoval and Gonzaga, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 843
(2005); Andrew L. Campbell, Can Federal Regulations Ever Create Federal Rights Privately Enforceable Under Section 1983? 38 IND. L. REV. 727 (2005); Stephenson, supra note 29, at 93.
37. One piece of commentary has addressed the private enforceability of federal regulations
under § 1983 in view of threats to equal educational opportunity for African-Americans. Sam Spital,
Restoring Brown's Promise of Equality after Sandoval: Why We Can't Wait, 19 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 93, 111-20 (2003), and another has briefly considered the issues in view of the
racially disparate impact of individual litigants' diminishing ability to enforce due process rights in
the administration of welfare programs, Risa E. Kaufman, Bridgingthe Federalism Gap: Procedural
Due Process and Race Discrimination in a Devolved Welfare System, 3 HASTINGS RACE AND
POVERTY L.J. 1,4, 10-14 (2005).
38. See Save our Valley, 335 F.3d at 938; Davant, supra note 36, at 635; McKennett, supra
note 36, at 209-17.
39. "The principle (based on the separation-of-powers concept) limiting Congress's ability to
transfer its legislative power to another governmental branch, esp. the executive branch." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 459 (8th ed. 2004). See infra Parts llI.B and IV.
40. Save our Valley, 335 F.3d at 954 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part).
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crabbed conformity to the current trend in the federal judiciary of limiting remedies for the violation of rights,41 which is, in turn, a serious
threat to the realization of equal justice under law.
Part II of this Comment will sketch the contours of institutional
spheres where racism persists today. Part III of this Comment then proceeds to acquaint the reader with the relevant cases and commentary that
have addressed the issues relating to the private enforceability of federal
regulations as a matter of law. These sources focus primarily on principles of administrative law, statutory interpretation, and congressional
intent as to the creation of individually enforceable rights and remedies.
Part IV of this Comment will then undertake a discussion of the nondelegation doctrine and its theoretical bases in the context of regulatory
rights creation, which compels the conclusion that the soundest approach
is to recognize the power of agencies to create rights privately enforceable under § 1983, so long as the discretion to do so is properly constrained by particularized judicial review.
II.

CONSTITUTIONALLY UNPROTECTED SPACES:

INSTITUTIONAL RACISM IN HOUSING AND EDUCATION

The movement for racial justice in the United States was dealt a
crushing blow by the Supreme Court's decision in Washington v.
Davis.42 In that case, plaintiffs brought suit to challenge the recruitment
practices of the Washington, D.C. Police Department on equal protection
grounds. 43 They argued that various practices, namely a written personnel test, deprived them of their constitutional rights because black applicants failed the test at a disproportionate rate.44 Writing for the Court,
Justice White reversed summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that
"[d]isproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of invidious intent forbidden by the Constitution., 45 The principle
that purpose or intent must be shown in order to sustain a constitutional
challenge to racial discrimination has become a central tenet of the

41. The Honorable Marsha S. Berzon, Righis andRemedies, 64 LA. L. REV. 519, 525 (2004).

42. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
43. Id. at 229. Because plaintiffs challenged the procedure of the District of Columbia, not a
State, they actually alleged a violation of the Due Process Clause of the 5th Amendment. See id.
That clause has been read to incorporate an element of the guarantee of equal protection explicitly
stated in the 14th Amendment. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-99 (1954).
44. Davis, 426 U.S. at 232.
45. Id. at 242.
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Court's equal protection jurisprudence 46 and relief from racial
discrimi47
nation under the Constitution has been precluded as a result.
Yet in Davis, Justice White recognized that the effects of discrimination can at times rise to the level of unconstitutionality. 48 Focusing on
the effects of discrimination is necessary because the problem of separating the general, acceptable effects of policy and administration from the
racially discriminatory effects is a very difficult one. 49 This is the task
that faces the current generation of Americans committed to ending racial injustice. It demands a "sensitive inquiry' 50 into complex and interrelated social, historical, and economic factors, and tools that are sufficiently particular to address them.
This is the practical justification for agency creation of individually
enforceable rights. Racism has changed a great deal; it has evolved into a
more complex and clandestine institutional form. 51 Therefore, to confront
it effectively requires greater subtlety and precision than Congress can
undertake; it requires "continuous expert supervision, capable of ad hoc
development parallel to the development of the subject matter involved. '5 2 Parts A and B of this section examine some of the conditions
under which racial discrimination persists. Part C then looks briefly at

46. K.G. Jan Pillai, Shrinking Domain of Invidious Intent, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 525,
529 (2001).
47. See, e.g., City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Comm. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 194-95
(2003) (no proof of racial animus in city's proposal of referendum to halt construction of lowincome housing for minority residents); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1977) (no proof that city's refusal to permit rezoning for construction for
racially integrated low-income housing was motivated by discriminatory intent); Indianapolis Minority Contractors Ass'n v. Wiley, 187 F.3d 743, 752-53 (7th Cir. 1999) (no proof that racially discriminatory administration of minority-owned business participation requirement of federal highway
funding scheme was motivated by racial animus); Hispanic Taco Vendors of Wash. State v. City of
Pasco, 994 F.2d 676, 679-80 (9th Cir. 1993) (no proof that enactment of licensing and other requirements for street vendors that had "severe disparate impact" was racially motivated); Riddick v.
Sch. Bd. of City of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521, 542-44 (4th Cir. 1986) (no proof of discriminatory intent
behind school assignment plan that re-segregated public schools through racially discriminatory
pupil assignment); Alexander v. Youngstown Bd. of Educ., 675 F.2d 787, 798-801 (6th Cir. 1982)
(insufficient proof of discriminatory intent in manipulation of school attendance zones and school
site selection).
48. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 242-44. Of course, Justice White viewed effects as relevant only
insofar as they were determinative of the underlying intent, which is still required to succeed on an
equal protection claim. Id.
49. ROBERT C. SMITH, RACISM IN THE POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: Now You SEE IT, NOW You
DON'T 34, 53 (1995).
50. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
5 1. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
52. WALTER GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 9 (1941), reprinted in
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 10 (Cass et al. eds., 2002).
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the present viability of Title VI regulations 53 that can be used to combat
institutional racism, notwithstanding the room for development of regulatory enactments that could more specifically address institutional racism.
A. InstitutionalRacism in Education
Despite the mandate issued in the historic Brown v. Board of Education decisions, 54 schools in the United States are still separate and unequal. 55 In 1978, approximately twenty years later, sixty percent of African-American primary school students attended predominantly minority
or racially isolated schools. 56 In 2003, a majority of black students still
attended schools where minorities represented a majority of the student
body.57 Moreover, desegregation as a national educational policy has
languished since the 1980s and has been characterized as a process "in
58
crisis.,
It is the effect of persistent segregation that is truly disturbing. In
schools that are comprised primarily of students of color, the conditions
are appalling. 59 The major problems stem from disparities in class sizeblack students' classes are on average eighty percent larger than white
students' classes-and the quality of teachers. 60 There is a seriously high
teacher turnover rate in schools with large minority concentrations,
reaching fifty percent in some school districts. 61 Moreover, the teachers
that are present for students of color are shockingly under-qualified. In
some of the worst schools, students of color have less than a fifty percent
chance of getting a math or science teacher with a degree in that field,62
53. Title VI regulations mirror the language of the enabling statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and

provide more specific prohibitions as well. See infra Part II.C.
54. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that separate educational facilities are inherently unequal);
349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II, ordering integration "with all deliberate speed").
55. NATIONAL COMM'N ON TEACHING AND AMERICA'S FUTURE, FIFTY YEARS AFTER BROWN:
A Two-TIERED EDUCATION SYSTEM 5 (2004), available at http://www.nctaf.org/documents/nctaf/
BrownFullReportFinal.pdf [hereinafterAFTER BROWN].
56. THE COUNCIL ON INTERRACIAL BOOKS FOR CHILDREN, FACT SHEETS ON INSTITUTIONAL
RACISM, (Jan. 1982) (quoting a 1981 report by the U.S. Department of Education).
57. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION STATUS
AND TRENDS IN THE EDUCATION OF BLACKS 12 (2003), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2003/
2003034.pdf.
58. See Wendy R. Brown, School DesegregationLitigation: Crossroadsor Dead End?, 37 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 923 (1993).
59. See, e.g., AFTER BROWN, supra note 55, at 15-19.
60. LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, UNEQUAL OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND EDUCATION, THE
BROOKINGS REVIEW, 28-32 (Spring 1998), available at http://www.brookings.org/press/review/
spring98/darling.htm.
61. AFTER BROWN, supra note 55, at 12.
62. DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 60, at 28-32.
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and black students are twice as likely to get teachers with less than three
years of experience. 63 These serious problems combine with inadequate
facilities, computer and internet access, textbooks, and sanitary and
safety standards-such as infestation with vermin like cockroaches, rats,
and mice 64 -to render these schools shamefully
unfit to close the recog65
nized gap in educational opportunity.
66
These problems flow most directly from the disparities in funding.
The wealthiest ten percent of American schools spend ten times more
than the poorest ten percent (overwhelmingly comprised of students of
color); and within a given state, a spending ratio of three to one between
such schools is not uncommon.6 7 These inequalities result primarily from
property tax school finance schemes.68 However, since San Antonio v.
69
Rodriguez, such schemes have been unassailable on constitutional
grounds. In that case, the plaintiffs' challenged a finance scheme which
resulted in roughly twice the per-pupil expenditure for predominantly
white districts as for predominantly minority districts, 70 but the Supreme
Court refused to apply strict scrutiny to (and thereby effectively sustained) a system that discriminated against "such a large, diverse, and
amorphous class" as a school district. 71 Certainly the statistical data were
complex and not perfectly conclusive, but it seems a stretch to describe
as "amorphous" a school district composed of seventy-nine percent minority students 7 2
Nevertheless, despite the unavailability of a constitutional equal
protection claim to challenge funding inequities, the unequal educational
opportunity resulting from this form of institutional racism 73 can obvi63. NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE ANNUAL REPORT: THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 3 (2003),
available at http://www.nul.org/pdf/sobaexec.pdf.
64. AFTER BROWN, supra note 55, at 15-19.
65. Darling-Hammond, supra note 60, at 28-32.
66. Id.

67. Id.
68. See JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 54-55
(1991). Under such schemes, the expenditures for each district are a function of the taxable property
wealth for that district. Id. Since people of color are less likely to own valuable property and more
likely to live in districts with less property wealth generally, the expenditures for predominantly
minority schools in predominantly minority districts are measurably inferior to those of propertyrich, predominantly white districts. See id.
69. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
70. Id. at 13 n.35.
71. Id. at 28.
72. Id. at 16 n.38.
73. Aside from the traditional arguments against sustaining an equal protection challenge on
disparate impact grounds, see Lawrence, supra note 27, at 320, some might defend property-tax
funding schemes by arguing that their effect on the quality of educational opportunity for children of
color is in fact not an example of institutional racism at all. If socio-economic status is separated
from the causal chain, there may be support for the argument that such schemes are really more
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ously be circumvented through real, meaningful desegregation of
schools. Yet, as mentioned above, school desegregation as a national
educational policy is in crisis. 74 While many of the nation's schools were
successfully desegregated throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, a
continuous process of school resegregation has been observed since
then.75 This is due in large part to the termination of desegregation orders
issued by federal district courts pursuant to the Brown decisions 76 and to
the prohibition of voluntary continuance with desegregation plans by
local school boards.7 7
In the heyday of school desegregation, local school districts undertook various measures to ameliorate the problem of "racially imbalanced ' 78 schools. The Supreme Court's decisions in Green v. County
School Board79 and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education80 were central in setting the course for remedial action. 81 In Green,
the Court imposed an affirmative duty on school boards to do whatever
necessary to end segregation, 82 and reaffirmed the directive that district
courts overseeing desegregation orders were to assess the racial impact
of the boards' actions in the areas of: (1) school facilities, (2) transportation systems, (3) personnel, (4) extracurricular activities, and (5) school
district attendance zones. 83 In Swann, the Court approved the use of ra-

"institutionally classist" than racist. See Smith, supra note 49, at 53-54 (explaining the significance
of economic disadvantage in studies on disparate racial impact, and explaining the author's choice to
attempt to identify and analyze institutional racism, "controlling for social class" in order to separate
discrimination based on economic disadvantage from that based on race). However, as a theoretical
matter, it seems clear that institutional racism is itself largely responsible for the economic disparities that allow such schemes to result in disproportionate racial impact, especially when one considers that substantial portions of American history are characterized by the systematic political and
economic disenfranchisement of minority groups. See KNOULES & PREWITT, supra note 22, at 4.
Moreover, there is statistical evidence to suggest that race is more of an influential factor than class
in predicting which communities bear disproportionate burdens, at least with respect to the risk of
exposure to toxic pollution. See Laura Westra & Peter S. Wenz, Forward to FACES OF
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 8, at xv-xvi.
74. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
75. Erica Frankenberg, Chungmei Lee & Gary Orfield, A MultiracialSociety with Segregated
Schools. Are we Losing the Dream?, THE HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT (2003), at 4, available
at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf.
76. Id.
77. Id.at 6.
78. The term appears in much of the literature and case law following the Brown decisions. See
cases compiled in E.H. Schopler, Annotation, De Facto Segregation of Races in Public Schools, II
A.L.R.3d 780 (2005).
79. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
80. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
81. See John Charles Boger, Willful Colorblindness: The New Racial Piety and the Resegregation of Public Schools, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1719, 1735-37 (2000).
82. Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38.
83. Id. at 435-37.
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cial considerations to meet the challenges in these areas, so that raceconscious measures such as racial ratios for student populations, 8 4 minority student transfer options,85 school district attendance zone selection,86
and busing programs 87 were permissible.
Tools like these are necessary because racially imbalanced schools
are rendered so not only by past de jure segregation, but often by residential housing patterns and other subtle factors as well. 88 One such factor is the location of school facilities-where a new school is to be built
often directly determines who will attend it. 89 If a school is built in the
center of a segregated neighborhood, the school itself is likely to be seg90
regated, especially if there is a neighborhood school policy in effect.
This segregation is compounded by feeder school policies, which require
students that graduate from certain elementary schools to attend certain
middle or junior high schools, and students from certain junior high
schools to attend certain high schools. 9 1 In addition to the location of the
school in relation to the surrounding neighborhood,
the nature of the lo92
effect.
segregative
serious
a
have
can
cation itself
Despite the real progress made during the last thirty years, 93 efforts
to desegregate schools and to equalize educational opportunity have
withered on the vine since the Reagan Administration reoriented the De-

84. Swann, 402 U.S. at 25.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 28.
87. Id. at 30-31.
88. See Michele Adams, Shifting Sands. The Jurisprudenceof Integration,Past, Present, and
Future, 47 HOW. L.J. 795, 806-08 (2004); Owen Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The
ConstitutionalConcepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564, 565 (1965).
89. DISCRIMINATION AMERICAN STYLE, supra note 4, at 124. See also Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No.
1,413 U.S. 189 (1973).
90. A neighborhood school policy, as the name suggests, is a policy under which school attendance district lines are drawn as nearly as possible to include only the residential area surrounding
the school, with geographical and other factors sometimes being considered. Students living in immediate residential vicinity are ordinarily required to attend that school. See Downs v. Bd. of Educ.
of Kansas City, 336 F.2d 988, 991-92 (10th Cir. 1964). Such plans do not of themselves violate the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Los Angeles, 458 U.S. 527, 536-37
(1982) (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976)).
91. Downs, 336 F.2d at 992.
92. See, e.g., Bivins v. Bd. of Public Educ. and Orphanage for Bibb County, 284 F. Supp. 888,
894-95 (M.D. Georgia 1967). In Bivins, the court upheld an injunction against construction of a new
high school because it was located in a predominantly black neighborhood and also because the
proposed site was so small that it could not foreseeably be enlarged to accommodate non-minority
students or to separate it into two separate schools for both sexes, which the court recognized was
customary in the local white schools and presumably required if white students were to choose to
attend a particular school.
93. Frankenberg, et al., supra note 75 at 6.
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partment of Justice against desegregation in the 1980s. 94 Since then, and
the confluence of a majority of conservative justices,95 three Supreme
Court decisions 96 have departed from the strong standards set forth in
Green and Swann 97 and have paved way for termination of dozens of
desegregation orders across the country. 98 The consequence is an alarm99
ing resegregation that threatens to undo the progress made since Brown,
though one could argue that this has already occurred since, nationwide,
schools are now more segregated than they were in 1970.100
B. InstitutionalRacism in Housing
Racial segregation in housing exists today because of a wide range
of private action and public policy throughout the twentieth century) ° l
For the purposes of this discussion, 0 2 however, the story begins with the
suburban expansion following World War II. At that time, the newly created Federal Housing Administration' 0 3 facilitated white flight' 0 4 from
94. Id. at 18.
95. See The Honorable David S. Tatel, Judicial Methodology, Southern Desegregation,and the
Rule of Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1071, 1072 (2004). Judge Tatel identifies the appointment of conservative Supreme Court Justices by Presidents Nixon, Reagan, and George H. W. Bush with each
President having the intention to appoint "strict constructionists" to the Court in order to eschew
judicial activism, but in Judge Tatel's view, the opposite result occurred, at least in the context of
desegregation jurisprudence.
96. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Bd. of
Educ. of Oklahoma v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
97. See Tatel, supra note 95, at 1076-77.
98. For a summary of desegregation orders that have been terminated, see Frankenberg, et al.,
supra note 75, at 69-75.
99. Id. at 6.
100. See id. at 30-31.
101. See Gary Orfield, Housing andthe Justificationof School Segregation, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
1397, 1398 (1995); Deborah Kenn, Housing Choice Case Studies: The Twin Cities Region in Minnesota and City of Rochester/Monroe County, New York, II J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY
DEV. L. 303, 304 (2002) (providing a fairly comprehensive outline that traces the segregative effects
of housing policy from the turn of the twentieth century to the present).
102. Since 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies only to state action, this Comment's focus on institutional
racism is primarily limited to discrimination by public entities. See infra Part III.A. 1.
103. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was created in 1934 in order to facilitate
home ownership by guaranteeing loans with U.S. Treasury bonds. Meredith Lee Bryant, Combating
School Resegregation through Housing: A Need for the Reconceptualization of American Democracy and the Rights it Protects, 13 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 127, 133-34 (1997).
104. Interestingly enough, the term has a definition in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary: "the
departure of whites from places (as urban neighborhoods or schools) increasingly or predominantly
populated by minorities." available at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&
va=white+flight (last visited Sept. 4, 2006). White flight also has a significant effect on housing
segregation; the two are entwined in a "vicious cycle." Deborah Kenn, InstitutionalizedLegal Racism: Housing Segregation andBeyond, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 35, 48 (2001). Property tax finance
schemes work to devalue property because wealthier people choose not to live in areas with poorer
schools, thus driving the property value down further. Id. at 49. Moreover, residential areas are coextensive with formal and informal opportunity structures, including schools, the most beneficial of
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the cities by using redlining' °5 and other lending practices aimed at ensuring neighborhood stability by preventing infiltration of "inharmonious
racial or nationality groups"' 0 6 into the suburbs. However, these policies
created segregated, poverty-stricken, and deteriorated minority communities in the cities 0 7 that soon presented problems for affluent whites in
the suburbs. 0 8 Whites clamored for federal relief from urban deterioration because they had economic interests in the universities, hospitals,
and businesses in the dilapidated urban centers,' 0 9 and because those deteriorated minority communities often stood in the way of highway development to bring suburban whites to and from these institutions. 0
In order to address these issues, so-called "urban renewal"'' 1 projects began."12 Such projects involve the formulation of a renewal plan
based on undesirable conditions,"' 3 acquisition of the property by a local
agency pursuant to the power of eminent domain, 14 and substantial fiwhich are denied to persons of color segregated in urban centers. Id. at 5 1. See also Orfield, supra
note 101, at 1398, 1404-06.
105. Redlining was based on a property value rating system used by the FHA to determine
which communities posed too high a lending risk; administrators marked inner-city minority
neighborhoods in red on city maps to identify them. The FHA and the Veteran's Administration
(VA) borrowed this system from the Home Owner's Loan Corporation (HOLC), a similar agency of
the federal government created in 1933 to help homeowners avoid foreclosure or default on their
mortgages. Kenn, supra note 101, at 305.
106. Bryant, supra note 103, at 133 (quoting DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON,
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993)).
107. Redlining, for example, artificially lowers property values causing homeowners to move
out and preventing new ones from moving in; "the community goes into a tailspin, with the ultimate
result that sound existing housing prematurely deteriorates and the community dies a premature
death." DISCRIMINATION AMERICAN STYLE, supra note 4, at 102-03 (quoting the U.S. Senate,
Hearings on S. 1281 Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th
Cong. 1 (1975)).
108. Bryant, supra note 103, at 134.
109. Id.
110. DISCRIMINATION AMERICAN STYLE, supra note 4, at 107.
111. David H. Harris, Jr., Esq., The Battle For Black Land: FightingEminent Domain, NBA
NAT'L B. ASS'N MAG. 12 (Apr. 1995). See also Lisa A. Kelly, Race and Place: Geographic and
Transcendent Community in the Post-Shaw Era, 49 VAND. L. REV. 227, 294 n.217 (quoting K.
Leroy Ervis, long-time activist in the Pittsburg area as saying "Of course, we all knew in those days
that 'urban renewal' was just another name for 'negro removal.').
112. Bryant, supranote 103, at 134.
113. The widely used term for such conditions is "blight," though itsexact definition seems to
vary. See Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Development, and the Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305 (2004).
114. Several state statutes also authorize and provide for urban redevelopment projects planned
and undertaken by private corporations with the state contributing its power of eminent domain. See
generally Annotation, C.C. Marvel, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Statues Providingfor Urban Redevelopment by Private Enterprise, 44 A.L.R.2d 1414 (2003). During the editing of this
Comment, the U.S. Supreme Court issued the decision in Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 125 S.
Ct. 2655 (2005), which held that privately held property could be transferred to another private entity under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment so long as it satisfies the public use require-
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nancing by the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD)." 5 Though they disproportionately affected urban residents by
demolishing their economically deprived neighborhoods," 6 this activity
was, almost without exception, held to be a "public use" justifying the
exercise of eminent domain." 7 Moreover, although Congress charged
HUD with the "elimination of substandard and other inadequate housing,,,18 the minority victims of "urban renewal" have been shuffled into
just that: inadequate, segregated public housing projects." 9 More often
20
than not, however, they are actually left homeless.
The placement of public housing within certain communities, like
the placement of schools,' 2' has often been used to perpetuate segregation.122 In Chicago, for example, legislation was once in force that allowed the city council to delegate veto power over proposed public hous23
ing sites to affluent white neighborhoods. 1
More recently, courts have identified this form of institutional racism being practiced in various cities under the auspices of HUD. Discriminatory public housing site selection, operating in tandem with dis-

criminatory zoning laws, 124 offered a very effective means of isolating
people of color. 25 And it still does, since although racial zoning was outlawed in 1917,126 wealthy white suburban communities have used exclusionary zoning to limit residential lot-sizes and prevent27 low-to-moderate
income housing developments in their neighborhoods.
ment. It seems clear that if the permissible scope of takings is increased by any measure, the possibility of such exercises of eminent domain that perpetuate disparate treatment of communities of
color will also increase. Indeed, securing compliance by private developers with existing antidiscrimination standards and otherwise preventing those entities from unjustly distributing the costs and
benefits of development are tasks which in the future may require specific and detailed attention by
administrative agencies.
115. See generally Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Who is Entitled to Attack Urban Renewal
Projects Undertaken Pursuantto FederalHousingAct of 1949, 8 A.L.R. FED. 415 (1996).
116. DISCRIMINATION AMERICAN STYLE, supra note 4, at 106-07.
117. See Adam P.Hellegers, Eminent Domain as an Economic Displacement Tool: A Proposal
to Reform HUD Displacement Policy, 2001 L. REV. MICH. ST. U.DET. C.L. 901, 942-48 (2001).
118.42 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006).
119. Bryant, supra note 103, at 134.
120. DISCRIMINATION AMERICAN STYLE, supra note 4, at 107.
121. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
122. See Bryant, supra note 103, at 134-35, 138-39.
123. Id. at 135.
124. Id. at 137.
125. See id. at131-32.
126. Buchanan v.Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917)
127. See Bryant, supra note 103, at 132, citing the noteworthy case of Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). Zoning raises
important questions about
the treatment of housing segregation inan institutional
racism model. One can argue that discrimination effectuated by zoning is a sad but inevitable reality because white people, like persons of color,
have a right to choose where they want to live and to protect the value of their property through
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The means to tackle certain forms of housing discrimination exist in
the form of Fair Housing laws, though these are certainly of questionable
effectiveness.128 As to "urban renewal," the phrase has become even
more euphemistic since the advent of Community Development Block
Grants (CDBG) 129 because funds are remitted to local agencies before
their specific use has been determined, 30 so that local agencies are too
often captured by private enterprise. 13 These projects now more often
function as commercial tax abatements, subsidizing shopping malls and
32
commercial developments rather than addressing deteriorated housing.
However, they are very difficult to challenge
because of the expansive
133
reading of the "public use" requirement.
Even when urban redevelopment demolishes communities of color
and displaces residents, HUD is supposed to provide "adequate relocation assistance.' 34 Historically, however, this has not been the case 35
measures such as residential zoning. In this view, exclusion of minority and low-income citizens
from a predominantly white socio-economic enclave as in Arlington Heights is not racism, but perhaps, the cause and effect of market forces. See John Charles Boger, Toward Ending Residential
Segregation: A Fair Share Proposalfor the Next Reconstruction, 71 N.C.L.R. 1573, 1576 (1993).
However, an alternative perspective of racial discrimination, viewing it in terms of agency, will lead
one to a different conclusion. See Justin D. Cummins, Refashioning the Disparate Treatment and
DisparateImpact Doctrines in Theory and in Practice, 41 HOW. L.J. 455, 470-72 (1998). In this
view, individuals must be understood as relational beings, shaped by experience and interaction with
others and society at large. Id. at 470. If past societal discrimination has created inequities which
currently exist, then conduct which perpetuates this status quo, even if not consciously or intentionally discriminatory, is a discriminatory agency that is responsible for its continued effects. Id. Indeed, this concept is recognized insofar as the discriminatory purpose that offends the Constitution
may be established in part by proof of the maintenance of a particular policy or practice with knowledge of its discriminatory effect. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465 (1982). Accordingly, it is not such a stretch to suggest that a failure to address the maintenance of deteriorated
urban minority communities and attendant dual school systems of disparate quality would amount to
racial discrimination that is at least culpable enough in a broad policy sense to be remedied.
128. Kenn, supra note 104, at 37. "It may even be opined that the Fair Housing Act presents a
smoke screen behind which lawmakers can hide, pretending the consequences of our racism are
being dealt with, while in truth the separation of races remains unchallenged." Id."The current ineffectiveness of the Fair Housing Act goes beyond the initial deliberate ineffectiveness of the Act,
which was passed into legislation in 1968 without any substantial enforcement mechanisms." Id.
129. Urban renewal under HUD and the Urban Renewal Agency were replaced in 1974 with
the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program. Gordon, supra note 113, at 323.
CDBGs are often given to local housing authorities before the specific use of the funds has even
been determined. Hellegers, supra note 117, at 926.
130. Hellegers, supra note 117, at 926.
131. See id.at 905 ("the greater involvement of business in setting local public policy, the
increasing competition for jobs between localities, and a concomitant rise in the amount of state and
local government subsidy of corporate activity all suggest that local government is extremely susceptible to corporate interest influence when making its economic development decisions.") (citations omitted).
132. See Gordon, supra note 113, at 313, 317-20.
133. See supranote 116-17 and accompanying text.
134. 24 C.F.R. § 970.5 (2005).
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and it is still a problem today, even though HUD regulations are supplemented by the provisions of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real
Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970.136 The lack of clear regulatory
standards for federal financial support may be part of the problem,' 37 but
the main obstacle to relief for displaced minority residents is the woefully inadequate federal oversight that fails to ensure local compliance
with HUD regulations.138 This suggests the need for private enforcement
under § 1983.
C. Regulatory Remediation: Title VI Regulations andBeyond
Although the Supreme Court held that purpose or intent is required
to sustain an equal protection claim under the Constitution' 39 and Title
VI, 140 there are literally dozens of federal regulations that forbid any recipient of federal financial assistance from subjecting anyone to discrimination on the basis of race. 141 These disparate impact regulations
were promulgated pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964142
and were based on a model draft developed by a Presidential Task Force

135. See Bryant, supra note 103, at 134.
136.42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4651 (2004). See, e.g., § 4621(b) ("The primary purpose of this Title
to ensure that [persons displaced as a result of programs or projects undertaken by a Federal agency
or with Federal financial assistance] shall not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of programs
or projects undertaken for the benefit of the public as a whole and to minimize the hardship of displacement on such persons."); § 462 1(c)(3) ("It is the intent of Congress that . . . the policies and
procedures of this Act will be administered in a manner is consistent with fair housing requirements
and which assures all persons of their rights under. . . Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.").
137. See generally Hellegers, supra note 117. Hellegers argues generally, and specifically with
respect to CDBGs, that HUD approval and support of local urban redevelopment should be contingent on a full cost-benefit analysis, and as opposed to the "vague and toothless policy of minimizing
displacement," should take into account the fiscal and social costs of displacement. Id. at 952.
138. Id. at 926.
139. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
140. Regents of the Univ. of Califomia v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See also infra note 197.
141. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 15 (2005) (Department of Agriculture); 10 C.F.R. § 1040 (2005)
(Department of Energy); 15 C.F.R. § 100 (2005) (Department of Commerce); 24 C.F.R. § 1 (2005)
(Department of Housing and Urban Development); 29 C.F.R. § 31 (2005) (Department of Labor); 34
C.F.R. § 100 (2005) (Department of Education); 49 C.F.R. § 21 (2005) (Department of Transportation). The provisions generally state:
The purpose of this part is to effectuate the provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (hereafter referred to as the Act) to the end that no person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be otherwise subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance [from the agency].
Subsequent regulations in each part then proceed to describe the types of programs covered by the
regulations, and the types of activities having disparate impact on people on the basis of race that are
proscribed.
142. 88 Pub. L. No. 352, 78 Stat. 252 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-7).
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43
that included the Department of Justice and several executive agencies.'
There has been considerable confusion and controversy over whether
44
Title VI and its implementing regulations are privately enforceable,1
but as a general matter, the precision with which they speak to certain
factual situations demonstrates how well-suited regulations are for use in
combating institutional racism. What follows is a brief discussion of
some regulations that keenly address the complex factors responsible for
institutional racism.

1. Education
As more and more still-segregated school districts are declared desegregated145 and the federal courts withdraw from their historic mandate
of supervising the equalization of educational opportunity, the progress
made toward racial justice is seriously threatened. 46 Yet, federal regulations promulgated by the Department of Education (DOE) 147 can fill the
void. These regulations address the specific factual predicates of institutional racism and segregation
that were previously identified in the
148
decisions.
Swann
and
Green
At the outset, the fact that federal judicial supervision was necessary to ensure local compliance by school boards might demonstrate
once again why federal regulations should be privately enforceable.
However, the reason courts have moved toward restoring control to local
school boards does not seem to square well with private enforceability of
federal regulations. 149 Nevertheless, local school districts, like most local
governmental entities, are already subject to federal regulations because
they choose to accept financial assistance from the federal govern-

143. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Com'n of City of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 618 (1983)

(Marshall, J., dissenting).
144. See infra note 197.
145. Frankenberg, et al., supra note 75, at 4.
146. See supra note 54-58 and accompanying text.
147. 34 C.F.R. § 100 (2005).
148. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
149. The reason is the notion that restoration of local control is and always has been the ultimate goal of the judicial supervision of desegregation. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489-90
(1992). Justice Kennedy stated:
Although this temporary measure has lasted decades, the ultimate objective has not
changed-to return school districts to the control of local authorities. Just as a court has
the obligation at the outset of a desegregation decree to structure a plan so that all avail-

able resources of the court are directed to comprehensive supervision of its decree, so too
must a court provide an orderly means for withdrawing from control when it is shown
that the school district has attained the requisite degree of compliance.
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ment.150 Furthermore, the context in which concerns over federal control
of local school boards arose was that of structural injunctive relief,151
which is distinguishable from financial assistance conditions in terms of
the type and extent of federal control. 5 2 To allow citizen suits for violations of these federal regulations would not raise the specter of an overbearing federal government because it would not substantially increase
federal control of local entities. Instead, it would allow effective confrontation of institutional racism'5 3 and segregation, since
racism "and its
' 54
manifestations may emerge in new and subtle forms."'
The regulations of the Office for Civil Rights of the DOE not only
prohibit the use of federal funds in any program of a recipient of federal
financial assistance, 55 but also prohibit certain "specific discriminatory

150. "It is far from a novel proposition that, pursuant to its powers under the Spending Clause,
Congress may impose conditions on the receipt of federal funds, absent some independent constitutional bar." Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1985).
15 1. Desegregation decrees and subsequent judicial supervision of compliance therewith is
relief that is injunctive in nature. See Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248-49
(1991). "Citation of the many elements of a structural injunction is sometimes difficult," but generally, it is an injunction intended "to alter broad social conditions by reforming the internal structural
relationships of government agencies or public institutions. Instrumentally, it operates through forward-looking mandatory injunction but assumes a relatively intrusive form, a more or less detailed
order whose prescriptions displace significant areas of defendants' discretion." Robert E. Easton,
The Dual Role of the Structural Injunction, 99 YALE L.J. 1983, 1983 n.1 (1990) (citing P. Shuck,
Suing Government: Citizen Remedies for Official Wrongs 151 (1983)). The structural injunction is
said to have first been used in Brown itself. See Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Casefor
ConstitutionalProtection of Foster Childrenfrom Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
199, 252 n.287 (1988). Since then, they have been issued in order to remedy the deprivation of rights
in prisons, mental hospitals, and public housing. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 126 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Needless to say, structural injunctions have been staunchly criticized by
some as overreaching exercises of the court's equitable power that offend constitutional norms of
federalism and the separation of powers. See id. "Judges have directed or managed the reconstruction of entire institutions and bureaucracies, with little regard for the inherent limitations on their
authority." See also generally Robert F. Nagel, Controlling the StructuralInjunction, 7 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 395 (1984).
152. In my opinion, many of the concerns present in judicial supervision of institutional reform
can be alleviated by private suits to enforce statutory or regulatory rights. Whereas structural injunctive relief contemplates judicial pronouncements as to how to achieve sweeping institutional reform
that may be infeasible, private suits can shift the responsibility of securing compliance to the institutional actors themselves, at least with respect to forward-looking decisions like school facility site
selection, by simply preventing them from implementing discriminatory plans in the first place. In
this way, courts are relieved from the difficult tasks of trying to foresee unintended consequences
and trying not to affect unanticipated parties when ordering particular remedial action.
153. It would also allow for effective concurrent and collaborative regulation by the states and
the federal government. See Galle, supra note 36, at 192-208.
154. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490.
155. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(a) (2005) provides, in pertinent part, that "No person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be otherwise subjected to discrimination under any program to which this
part applies."
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actions."'' 56 Fortunately, one such prohibited action is "subject[ing] an
individual to segregation."' 7 Moreover, the specific problem of school
site selection that threatens to maintain or resuscitate segregation in
schools is addressed by another specific prohibition. 58 That section of
the Code prohibits the selection of school or facilities locations that have
"the effect of excluding individuals from, denying them the benefits of,
or subjecting them to discrimination."'' 59 An action brought under § 1983
to enforce these regulations could serve to prevent the construction of an
elementary school in the heart of a ghetto which
would perpetuate sepa160
rate and unequal education for years to come.
The DOE regulations also provide generally that recipients of federal funding may not "utilize criteria or methods of administration which
have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of
their race, color, or national origin."'16 1 An attempt to enforce this regula162
tion could help to thrust the school funding problem to the forefront.
As this discussion illustrates, the potential efficacy of administrative regulations to keenly address forms of institutional racism yet to be
discovered (and yet to be developed) should not be discounted. The expertise and ability to focus on specific issues' 63 and the insulation from

156. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b) (2005).
157. Id. § 100.3(b)(iii).
158. Id. § 100.3(b)(vii)(3).
159. Id. This subdivision also states that in determining the site or location of facilities, no
selections may be made "with the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing the accomplishment of the objectives of [The Civil Rights Act or 34 C.F.R.]."
160. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 20 ("[t]he construction of new schools and the closing of old ones
are two of the most important functions of local school authorities... [o]ver the long run, the consequences of the choices will be far reaching.").
161.34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2005).
162. See, e.g., Paynter ex rel. Stone v. New York, 290 A.D.2d 95 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). In
Paynter,a class action on behalf of 35,000 New York public school students, the plaintiffs asserted a
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2). See supra note 123 and accompanying text. Plaintiffs argued that New York's Education Law, § 3202, which mandated a
neighborhood school policy, had a racially disparate impact in violation of the regulation. Paynter,
290 A.D.2d at 102-03. Sidestepping the issue of whether the regulation could be enforced under §
1983, the court held that the Education Law was applied uniformly and so could not be said to have
a racially disparate impact. Id. Arthur Eisenberg, Legal Director for the New York Civil Liberties
Union, later mentioned the involvement of the New York Civil Liberties Union as amicus in Paynter
as well as other similar cases in testimony before the New York State Commission on Education
Reform, and discussed the problem of "failing schools" and urged the commission to cure the "constitutional deficiencies" in the New York State education system. Testimony of Arthur N. Eisenberg
On Behalf of the New York Civil Liberties Union Presented to the New York State Commission on
Education Reform, available at http://www.nyclu.org/education-reform-testimony_121203.html
(last visited May 11, 2006).
163. Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk,
and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1042 (2006).
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political pressure that administrative agencies164 enjoy place them in an
enviable position to do the work of rooting out persistent institutional
injustices. Desegregation of public schools, for example, was a task that
required "awareness that complex and multifaceted problems would arise
'' 65
which would require time and flexibility for a successful resolution."
Among these were the aforementioned difficulties inherent in school site
selection, attendance zones, and school funding. 166 But the future will
probably bring more complex instantiations of institutional racism, as
well as revelation of yet undiscovered forms, and for this reason, creation
of specific and nuanced individually enforceable rights is desirable.
2. Housing
The replacement of federal urban renewal programs with CDBGs
and the inability of HUD to properly oversee local projects have given
municipalities "virtual autonomy."' 67 This results in the lack of enforcement of many of the most progressive regulations that confront head-on
the institutional racism in urban redevelopment.1 68 First, people who are
displaced by a program funded by a CDBG are entitled to relocation assistance 169 in accordance with the Uniform Relocation Assistance and
Real Property Acquisition Policies Act. 70 The regulations mandate that
persons receive adequate notice of a displacement resulting from a feder72
71
ally funded project1 and that comparable housing be made available.

164. Of course, agencies are less politically insulated than courts, but more insulated than the
legislature: "[they] fall between the extremes of the politically over-responsive Congress and the
over-insulated courts." Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justificationforthe BureaucraticState,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1542 (1992).
165. Green, 391 U.S. at 437.
166. See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
167. Hellegers, supra note 117, at 926.
168. Id.
169.24 C.F.R. § 570.606 (2005).
170.42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4651 (2004). The implementing regulations of the Act are found at 49
C.F.R. Pt. 24 (2005).
171. 49 C.F.R. § 24.203(a). The code provides as follows:
[A] person scheduled to be displaced shall be fumished with a written description of the
displacing agency's relocation program which does at least the following: (1) Informs the

person that he or she may be displaced for the project and generally describes the relocation payment(s) for which the person may be eligible, the basic conditions of eligibility,
and the procedures for obtaining the payment(s), (2) Informs the person that he or she
will be given reasonable relocation advisory services, including referrals to replacement
properties, help in filing payment claims, and other necessary assistance to help the person successfully relocate ....

Id.
172. 49 C.F.R. § 24.204(a) (2005) ("No person to be displaced shall be required to move from

his or dwelling unless at least one comparable replacement dwelling ....
the person.").

has been made available to
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The regulations covering the relocation of residents of public housing
tenements are similar.' 73 More importantly, however, both the public
housing resident relocation regulation and the URA regulations prohibit
discrimination on the 174
basis of race, color, or national origin in the provision of these benefits.
The case of Wallace v. Chicago Housing Authority175 demonstrates
why these regulations are necessary to combat institutional racism. In
Wallace, the court reversed summary judgment against the plaintiff residents of public housing that was to be demolished so that other apartments for persons with higher incomes could be built. 176 Although the
Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) 17 7 was obligated to provide relocation
services, it failed to provide any relocation services at all for two
years. 178 When it finally began to provide such services, the plaintiffs
alleged that the CHA discriminated against them because it discouraged
them from inspecting or renting in predominantly white or racially integrated neighborhoods.179 The CHA failed to inform them of the desirable
80
features of white or racially integrated neighborhoods, actively steered1
them toward predominantly African-American neighborhoods, and failed
to effectively and affirmatively assist families in moving to integrated
neighborhoods. 181
The plaintiffs brought various claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including violations of the Fair Housing Act, 8 2 various HUD regula173. 24 C.F.R. § 970.5(a) (2005) (displaced residents "must be offered opportunities to relocate to other comparable/suitable... decent, safe, sanitary, and affordable housing").
174. 49 C.F.R. § 24.8 (2005) ("The implementation of this part must be in compliance with
other applicable laws and implementing regulations, including but not limited to, the following...
(b) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.)"); 24. C.F.R. § 970.5 (2005)
(the opportunity for housing offered must, in addition to being "decent, safe, sanitary, and affordable," be "to the maximum extent practicable, housing of their choice, on a nondiscriminatorybasis,
without regard to race, color, national origin ....) (emphasis added).
175. 298 F. Supp. 2d 710 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
176. Id.at 714.
177. Local housing authorities are public or administrative agencies of municipalities that
contract with HUD to receive federal funds for housing programs, and therefore must comply with
HUD regulations prohibiting discriminatory administration of such programs. See 40A AM. JUR. 2d.
Housing Laws and Urban Redevelopment § 11 (2006).
178. Wallace, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 715.
179. Id.at 714.
180. "Steering" is a form of housing discrimination "in which minority homebuyers are shown
houses, but in systematically different neighborhoods than those shown or recommended to comparable white homebuyers." Margery Austin Turner & Mars Mikelsons, Patterns of RacialSteering in
Four Metropolitan Areas, 2 J. OF HOUSING ECON. 199 (Sept. 1992). It is prohibited by the Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2005).
181. Wallace, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 714.
182. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2004). Plaintiffs here alleged violation of § 3608(e)(5), which
requires that the Secretary of HUD "administer the programs and activities relating to housing and
urban development in a manner affirmatively to further [fair housing]."
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tions,' 83 and Executive Orders 11,603 84 and 12,892. 85 The court rejected
the defendant's claim that § 1983 could not be used to enforce the regulations or the Executive Orders, holding that the affirmative duty to further fair housing established by each had been incorporated into the Fair
Housing Act. 186 In this way, the court was able to sidestep the issue of
executive branch rights-creation (which will be discussed in Part IV).
What Wallace demonstrates, however, is that because HUD and other
regulations address specific factual predicates of housing discrimination,
they are therefore well-suited for use in combating institutional racism.
III. SECTION 1983 AND STATUTORY SORCERY:
THE FOUNDATION OF THE CURRENT DEBATE

The questions of law bearing on whether individuals can privately
enforce federal regulations are several and varied; they involve statutory
construction, legislative intent, administrative law principles, and constitutional issues. However, in anticipation of these specific, focused inquiries, a broader framing of the relevant jurisprudential context is appropriate. The fight over private enforceability of regulations is larger than the
issues of administrative discretion and congressional oversight of agency
action. It speaks to the fundamental question of whether citizens may
seek redress for their grievances in the courts of law-whether the law
"means what it says" 187 or whether legal protections purposefully created
will languish as a mere "form of words."1 88
183. Wallace, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 718 (citing C.F.R. §§ 107.20(a), 903.7(o), 960.103(b)
(2005)).
184. Exec. Order 11,603, 27 Fed. Reg. 11527 (Nov. 20, 1962). Section 101 stated:
I hereby direct all departments and agencies in the executive branch of the Federal Government, insofar as their functions relate to the provision, rehabilitation, or operation of
housing and related facilities, to take all action necessary and appropriate to prevent discrimination because of race, color, creed, or national origin.
Id. It was revised in 1980 to include the words "religion" and "sex" in the list of prohibited bases of
discrimination. Exec. Order 12,259, 46 Fed. Reg. 1253 (Dec. 31, 1980).
185. Exec. Order 12,982 was issued by President William Jefferson Clinton in 1994 and provides that the heads of every executive agency are "responsible for ensuring that its programs and
activities relating to housing and urban development are administered in a manner affirmatively to
further the goal of fair housing." Exec. Order 12,892, 59 Fed Reg. 2939, § 2-202 (Jan. 17 1994).
186. Wallace is a very interesting case for this discussion because the court actually held that
Executive Orders 11,603 and 12,892 were enforceable under § 1983. Wallace, 298 F. Supp. 2d at
720. To some extent, rights-creation by executive order represents the extreme end of delegated
right-making authority, since it is accepted that executive agencies exercise "quasi-legislative"
power and the question seems a closer one in terms of the delegation issues presented. However,
rights-creation by executive order should not be dismissed without further consideration of the nondelegation doctrine in the context of delegated right-making authority.
187. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1,4 (1980).
188. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (explaining the need for the exclusionary rule to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights, since otherwise those guarantees would be meaningless).
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There is a disturbing trend in the federal courts to limit the availability of remedies for the violation of rights.18 9 Judge Berzon noted the
departure from the common law maxim of Marbury v. Madison,' to a
jurisprudence of "disembodied federal rights" characterized by rights that
are "uncoupled" from the remedies that are most often the only means
for their enforcement. 191 Berzon understands this shift as a result of conceptual confusion between rights and remedies, 192 and urges vigilance in
maintaining the analytical distinction between the two since failure to do
tremendous harm to legal doctrine and to individual rights
so "can effect 193
enforcement."
Judge Berzon saw this "uncoupling" of rights from remedies from
the vantage point of the dissent in Save our Valley v. Sound Transit.194 In
response to the proposed plan that would disproportionately burden the
residents of Rainier Valley, the Save our Valley organization took action.1 95 It brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983196 alleging a violation of a
disparate impact regulation promulgated by the Department of Transportation. 197 It alleged that Sound Transit had "utilized criteria or methods of
administration which [had] the effect of subjecting persons to discrimination because of their race."' 198 Judge Gould, writing for the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, held that federal administrative regulations alone could
never create a right enforceable through § 1983,199 and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against Save our Valley.2 ° °
Judge Gould relied on two recent cases of the Supreme Court in his
decision: Gonzaga University v. Doe20 1 and Alexander v. Sandoval.20 2 In
Gonzaga, the Court held that the inquiry to determine whether a statute
creates an implied right of action is the same as the inquiry to determine
189. Berzon, supra note 41, at 525.
190. 5 U.S. 137, 147 (1803). "It is a settled and invariable principle that every right, when

withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress." Id.
191. Berzon, supra note 41, at 534-35.
192. Apart from confusion spurred by doctrinal specifics discussed infra, rights and remedies
are also confused on a superficial level because of terminology-another name for a remedy, i.e., the
ability to go to court and sue, is a "right of action." See id. at 532 n.43.
193. Id. at 531.
194. 335 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2003). The facts of the case are referenced at the introduction of
this comment in notes 10-18 and the accompanying text. This case in large part prompted this Comment as the author resides less than five miles from the Rainier Valley community.
195. See Elaine Porterfield and George Foster, Rainier Valley Rail Foe Files Suit, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 27, 2000.
196. See infra Part IIl.A.
197. Save our Valley, 335 F.3d at 934-35.
198. 49 C.F.R. §21.5(b)(2) (2005).
199. Save our Valley, 335 F.3d at 941.

200. Id. at 946.
201. 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
202. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
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whether it creates a right enforceable through § 1983.03 In Sandoval, the
Court held that implied rights of action could only be created by Congress. 204 Judge Gould read these two cases together to require that only
Congress could create rights enforceable through § 1983.205 However,
although congressional intent in this area is of paramount importance
after Sandoval and Gonzaga,20 6 it has been argued that the holding in
Save our Valley is too broad and unsupported by precedent.2 °7 For these
reasons, it should be reconsidered and rejected in favor of an approach
that is more consonant with well-established principles of administrative
law. 20 8 The next Part sets out a brief history of § 1983 and explains more
fully the inferential leap in the Save our Valley holding, and why it is
unwarranted.
A. The Reach of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Section 1983 provides for a civil action against any person who,
under color of law, causes any citizen or person within a jurisdiction of
the United States to be subjected to the "the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. ' ' 20 9 The

statute was originally enacted as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,210
but it was narrowly interpreted for over for ninety years. 21 The beginning of the current debate over whether § 1983 can be used to enforce
federal regulations came in Maine v. Thiboutot, in which the Court ex203. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283-85.
204. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286.
205. Save our Valley, 335 F.3d at 937-39.
206. See infra Part llI.A.2.
207. See, e.g., Save our Valley, 335 F.3d at 952-60; Mank, supra note 36, at 888.
208. Save our Valley, 335 F.3d at 954-59; Mank, supra note 36, at 888.
209.42 US.C. § 1983 (2005).
210. 42nd Cong. Ch. 22, Apr. 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13. The language of the statute actually goes
back to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 39th Cong. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. That Act, the Civil Rights Act
of 1867, and the 1871 Act were revised, rearranged, and recodified along with the entire U.S. Code

by a congressional commission created for that purpose by President Andrew Johnson. See Todd E.
Pettys, The Intended Relationship Between Administrative Regulations and Section 1983 "s "Laws, "

67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 54-55 (1998). Needless to say, this course of events led Justice Powell
to remark that "[alnyone who ventures into the thicket of the legislative history of § 1983 quickly
realizes that there is no clearly marked path to the correct interpretation of the statute." Chapman v.
Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 623-24 (1979).
211. See Blackmun, supra note 30, at 8-10. In the beginning, the courts allowed use of § 1983
only to enforce rights like the right to sue, be sued, to testify in court, to make contracts, and the
right to buy, sell, and inherit property. Id. Thereafter, the reach of the statute was only as broad as
the Court's understanding of the state action requirement and the meaning of various constitutional
provisions. Id. (citing and discussing United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); and The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872)). The statute did
not begin to have the efficacy that it has today until the Court held in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961), that it could be used to sue a police officer for egregious conduct in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
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panded the reach of the "and laws" clause. 2 Writing for the majority,
Justice Brennan relied on the plain language of the statute, legislative
history, 213 and case law to hold firmly that "the phrase 'and laws,' as
used in § 1983, means what it says. 2 14 That is, the section can be used to
remedy a deprivation of rights secured only by statute.
During the 1980s, the Court began limiting the reach of Thiboutot
by setting out exceptions to the apparently broad reach of the statute.2 15
One such exception was that only federal laws that spoke to individuals
in mandatory, not precatory language, could create rights enforceable
under § 1983.216 Another was that § 1983 could only be used to privately
enforce a statutory right if Congress had not created a comprehensive
enforcement scheme.2 17 However, in a fragmented decision in Guardians
Association v. Civil Service Commission of the City of New York,2 18 several justices opined that § 1983's "and laws" clause covered not only
federal statutes but also regulations having the force of law. 2 19 Only once
212. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
213. Justice Brennan was convinced that "Congress knew what it was doing [when it inserted
the phrase "and laws"] and the legislative history does not demonstrate that the plain language was
not intended." Id. at 8. The argument made by the state of Maine was that when the 1874 Congress
divided the predecessor to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 from the jurisdictional provision therein (which later
became the model for the current jurisdictional section, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)), it meant to revise the
predecessor to § 1983 to apply to deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution or "of any right
secured by any law providing for equal rights" because it had so revised the predecessor to the jurisdictional section. Id. at 7 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Although it is well settled that § 1983
is available as a remedy for the deprivation of all rights (as that is term is defined doctrinally) created
by federal law, it bears mentioning for the purpose of this discussion that the laws (regulations) at
issue in this Comment are of the kind that provide for equal rights, and so any resurrected legislative
history argument to limit the scope of § 1983 as to the subject matter intended to be addressed by the
statute would fail in the context of this Comment.
214. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4.
215. See Samberg-Champion, How to Read Gonzaga: Laying the Seeds of a Coherent Section
1983 Jurisprudence, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1838, 1847-54 (2003). For a fairly comprehensive treatment of the Supreme Court's § 1983 jurisprudence, see id. at 1842-57.
216. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
217. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
218. 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (Justice White announced the judgment of the Court, in which Justice Rehnquist joined in part, Justices Powell and O'Connor filed separate dissenting opinions, Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion, and Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which
Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined).
219. Justice White stated that he believed that, even if Title VI did not prohibit disparate impact discrimination, its implementing regulations did and were valid and enforceable. Guardians,
463 U.S. at 593. Justice Marshall explained in a lengthy opinion that while Title VI may otherwise
be read to prohibit only intentional discrimination, it should not be so read in view of the authoritative construction it received by the several administrative agencies that interpreted it in promulgating
Title VI disparate impact regulations. Id. at 617-18. Justice Stevens stated that since Title VI was
intended to reach governmental actors, it probably required a showing of intent for a violation, but
that the implementing regulations that prohibited disparate impact were a different story, and are
privately enforceable under § 1983. Id.at 643-45. Guardiansis a very interesting case in addition to
the question of whether regulations can be privately enforced under § 1983 because the Court was
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since that decision has the Court held that the statute could be used to
enforce HUD regulations that secured a right to a reasonable allowance
for utilities in the computation of rents required by residents of publicly
subsidized housing. 220 For awhile, it seemed that rights individually enforceable under § 1983 could
be created by federal regulations provided
221

that they satisfied the test.

The applicable test to determine whether a statutory provision creates an individually enforceable federal right was set out most clearly in
22 2 The Court summarized it as follows: a statutory
Blessing v. Freestone.
provision gives rise to a federal right when (1) Congress intended the
provision to benefit the plaintiff, (2) the right protected by the provision
is "not so vague and amorphous that its enforcement would strain judicial competence," and (3) the provision unambiguously imposes a binding obligation on the state.223 If the provision satisfies these three elements, it merely raises a presumption that a right has been created.2 24 The
presumption can be rebutted by evidence that Congress has foreclosed a
remedy under § 1983, either expressly by stating so in the statute or impliedly by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with private enforcement under § 1983.225
At this point, it is appropriate to note that many regulations, including the DOE regulations discussed above in Part II, satisfy the Blessing
test. For example, the regulation guaranteeing that "[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be otherwise
divided over whether Title VI itself prohibited only intentional discrimination or disparate impact
discrimination. The primary point of contention was whether the Court in Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1973), by holding that Title VI incorporated the Constitutional intentionality standard, overruled the Court's previous decision in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974),
which held that proof of discriminatory impact was enough to sustain a Title VI claim. In Guardians,
only Justices White and Marshall believed that Title VI still reached disparate impact discrimination
after Bakke, though the arguments and case law marshaled in support of the differing positions
seemed a close question. See generally Guardians, 463 U.S. at 591, 623-24; Patricia Lines, J.D.,
Intent to Discriminate and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Lau, Bakke, and Guardians, 17
ED. LAW REP. 443 (1984); Bradford C. Mank, Are Title VI's DisparateImpact Regulations Valid?,
71 U. CIN. L. REV. 517, 521-28 (2002).
220. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418 (1987).

Although Wright held that the regulations at issue created rights that were privately enforceable
under § 1983, the Court did not explain whether the right was created implicitly by the enabling
statute or by the regulations alone. See Mank, supra note 33, at 343 n.166; Pettys, supra note 210, at
74-75. See also Bradford C. Mank, Suing under § 1983: The Future after Gonzaga University v.
Doe, 39 Hous. L. REV. 1417, 1462-63 (2003).
221. Davant, supra note 36, at 620-24.
222. 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
223. Id. at 340-41.
224. Id. at 341.
225. Id. at 341-42.
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subjected to discrimination under any program to which this part applies, '2 26 satisfies all three elements; in fact, the Court pointed to the
enabling Title VI statute, z27 which is nearly identical,228 as a model of
individual rights-creating language for purposes of § 1983.229 Likewise,
other regulations, such as the provision prohibiting school site selection
with discriminatory effects,2 30 display the requisite focus on individuals
and create a right which is neither vague nor amorphous, and unambiguously impose a binding obligation on governmental actors.
In view of the fact that many regulations do satisfy the Blessing
test, the debate over their private enforceability has tended to focus on
whether right-making is a proper activity in which administrative agencies should be engaged. 23 1 Those in favor of recognizing agencies' power
to create individually enforceable rights make the so-called Chevron argument. 232 The Chevron rule requires a two-step inquiry to determine
whether an agency's regulation is a valid interpretation of its enabling
233
statute. First, the court must determine whether Congress has "directly
spoken to the question at issue., 234 If the intent of Congress as to the
meaning of the statute is clear, then that meaning is controlling. 235 If not,
then the court must undertake the second step of the inquiry and determine whether the agency's construction of the statute is reasonable. 236 If
so, it is entitled to judicial deference.23 7 The Chevron argument for
agency rights-creation is that a regulation containing rights-creating language that is a reasonable construction of the enabling statute must create
an individual right privately enforceable under § 1983 in the same way a
statute would.238

226. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(a) (2005).
227. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2005).
228. It is exactly the same except for the word "otherwise."
229. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002).
230. 34 C.F.R. §100.3(b)(3) (2005) ("In determining the site or location of a facilities, an applicant or recipient may not make selections with the effect of excluding individuals from . . .or
subjecting them to discrimination under any programs to which [this part] applies") (emphasis
added). See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
231. See Galle, supra note 36, at 177-225; Davant, supra note 36, at 628-48; McKennett,
supra note 36, at 209-17.
232. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
233. Id. at 842-44 (1984).
234. Id
235. Id
236. Id
237. Id.
238. See Galle, supra note 36, at 177-92; Davant, supra note 36, at 642-44. Galle offers a
sophisticated analysis of the issues of statutory interpretation and federalism concerns raised by the
Chevron argument and agency rights-creation in general.
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Those who argue against agency creation of such rights maintain
that separation of powers principles, specifically the nondelegation doctrine, 239 strongly suggest that it is unconstitutional. 240 They reject the
Chevron argument on the ground that an agency regulation purporting to
create an individually enforceable right where the enabling statute does
not must be an unreasonable construction of the enabling statute, and
therefore invalid.2 4' While these arguments must be considered, it is appropriate first to examine the congressional intent issues made central by
Sandoval and Gonzaga.
B. Sandoval, Gonzaga, and CongressionalIntent
to Create Remedies (orRights?)
The talismanic phrase is "congressional intent." Did Congress intend regulations promulgated pursuant to its statutes to be privately enforceable under § 1983? The question is a confusing one, in part, because
of the importation of the doctrine of implied rights of action to the §
1983 context in Gonzaga.242 That importation has also exacerbated what
Judge Berzon calls the "uncoupling" of rights from remedies in federal
24 3

courts.

The doctrine of implied rights of action is largely a judicial response to the legal-historical development of code pleading.244 The Supreme Court's current statement of the doctrine is that it allows for judicial implication of a private remedy for violation of a federal statute if
four elements are satisfied: (1) the plaintiff is a member of the class intended to be benefited by the statute, or in other words, the statute creates
a right in the plaintiff, (2) Congress intended, either expressly or impliedly, to create a private remedy, (3) such a remedy is consistent with the
statutory scheme, and (4) the remedy is not one traditionally relegated to

See infra Part IV.
See Davant, supra note 36, at 628-41; McKennett, supra note 36, at 211-17.
Davant, supra note 36, at 644-48; McKennett, supra note 36, at 214.
See generally Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
See Berzon, supra note 41, at 540.
244. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article Ill and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REv. 777
(2004). At common law, redress for violations of rights required pleading in the particular, specific
cause of action, which carried with it "unique procedural incidents, a particular form of relief, and
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

specific forms ofjudgment and execution." Id. at 784. Developments in the law revealed this system
to be overwhelmingly rigid, and the development of code pleading with its putative one form of

action resulted. Id. at 793. Courts thereafter struggled with whether to recognize a cause of action for
statutory violations when the statute was silent as to a cause of action, and some began to recognize
implied rights of action where a statute conferred a benefit on an individual. Id. at 838. One of the
most celebrated cases is Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the FederalBureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971), in which the Supreme Court found implied in the Constitution a remedy for the

violation of Bivens' Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.
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state law in a field which is basically the concern of the states.245 This
test is notably more burdensome to meet for plaintiffs than the Blessing
test 246 since it focuses almost entirely on the creation of a remedy 247 and
thus implicates important separation of powers concerns. 24 8
In Sandoval, the Court circumscribed the application of the doctrine
of implied rights of action. In that case, the plaintiffs brought suit alleging a violation of Title VI's disparate impact regulations under an implied right of action theory, but the Court held that "like substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress. 2 49 "The judicial task," Justice Scalia stated, "is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays
intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy," and
"statutory intent on this latter point is determinative.' ' 25 0 However, while
the Court's holding in Sandoval made it clear that only Congress could
create implied rights of action, the holding in Gonzaga provided what
Judge Gould regarded as the nail in the coffin for agency creation of
rights enforceable under § 1983.
In Gonzaga, the plaintiff sued under § 1983 for violation of the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA) 25' when he
was denied a teaching certification.252 The denial occurred after the Gonzaga University teaching certification specialist overheard another student discussing alleged sexual misconduct on the part of the plaintiff, and
then relayed this information to the state licensing agency.2 53 The Court
held that the FERPA statute did not create a right enforceable under §
1983 because the statutory language did not focus specifically on individuals.2 54 But more importantly, the Court made it clear that the initial
inquiry in determining whether a statute has created an implied right of
action is the same inquiry to use in determining whether a statute confers
245. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
246. See supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
247. See Save our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 952 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that

while § 1983"is itself specific congressional intent to afford a private remedy for violation of rights,
and hence the inquiry is whether rights have been created by federal laws, the test for implied rights

of action is a four-part test, the last "three factors [of which) all concern whether it would be appropriate for a court to permit a private remedy in federal court to vindicate that right").
248. Gonzaga Univ. v.Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 300 (2002) (explaining that implied right of action
cases "reflect a concern, grounded in separation of powers, that Congress rather than the courts
controls the availability of remedies for violations of statutes) (quoting Wilder v. Virginia Hospital
Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990)). See also Berzon, supra note 41, at 541.
249. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001).
250. Id.
251.20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2000).
252. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 277.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 288.
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a right enforceable under § 1983.255 Citing implied right of action case
law, Chief Justice Rehnquist identified the new test 256 as follows: Congress must have intended an unambiguously conferred right to be created, and the statute purportedly creating it must manifest that intent and
be phrased in terms of the identifiable, individual persons to be benefited. 7
What is significant about Gonzaga is that, in importing the standard
for implied rights of action to § 1983 cases, it raised considerably the
burden on plaintiffs for establishing an individually enforceable right
under § 1983. This shift was not acknowledged by the Court, but was
identified by Justice Stevens, 258 Judge Berzon, 259 and various commentators.2 6° Moreover, the decision seemed to imply, at least for some,26 1 that
since only Congress could create an implied right of action, only Congress could create a right enforceable under § 1983. A superficial reading
of the tests might indicate that such an interpretation is justified by the
fact that each test does incorporate the element of whether Congress intended to create a federal right. On a doctrinal level, too, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's attempt to synthesize the doctrines, in light of Sandoval's
holding, may also suggest that privately enforceable rights must be created by Congress.
However, the inferential leap is erroneous because the difference
between implied rights of action and rights enforceable under § 1983 is
definitely a difference that makes a difference. Section 1983 is a completely different animal than an implied right of action. It is, in itself,
255. Id. at 283.
256. See Samberg-Champion, supra note 215, at 1854-57. Samberg-Champion provides an
excellent commentary on Gonzaga, and describes the rationale offered by the Court for its apparent
change of direction as "even murkier" than where the change seems to be directed.
257. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283-85.
258. See id. at 301 ("What has never before been required is congressional intent specifically to
make the right enforceable under § 1983 .... Yet that is exactly what the Court, at points, appears
to require by relying on implied right of action cases .... ") (emphasis in original).
259. See Berzon, supra note 41, at 540 ("the line of cases from Thiboutot through Blessing had
recognized that federal rights could be inferred from the intent and structure of the law in question[;]
Gonzaga University raised the bar.").
260. See, e.g., Samberg-Champion, supra note 215, at 1857.
261. See Save our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 937-39 (9th Cir. 2003) (reasoning
that, because Gonzaga held that Congress must have specifically intended to create a right in either
the implied right of action or § 1983 context, and because Sandoval held that only Congress could
create implied rights of action, only Congress can create rights enforceable under § 1983). See also
Davant, supra note 36, at 638-39 (reading Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979),
which held that the remedy component of an implied right of action must be provided by Congress
because the Court "is not at liberty to legislate," to suggest that right-making in any context is a
legislative activity and therefore, only Congress can do it). The latter argument is of course based on
the nondelegation doctrine, but it demonstrates the analytical consequence of incautiously importing
the doctrine of implied rights of action analysis into the § 1983 context. See infra part IV.
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specific congressional intent to create a private remedy.262 The implied
right of action test, with three of its four prongs dedicated to discerning
whether Congress specifically and deliberately intended a private remedy, is3 inapposite, because that requirement is always met in a § 1983
case.

26

In addition to the lack of separation of powers concerns in the §
1983 context, 264 the implied right of action analysis should also not be
imported to § 1983 cases with respect to rights-creation for another important reason. The Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to import
"even well-settled common law principles" into the § 1983 context. 265
Common law principles should not be used as anything more than a starting point in the § 1983 analysis unless they are consistent with the statutory analysis, have support in other textual provisions of § 1983, or when
the principles were so widely known at the time § 1983 was passed in its
original form that Congress cannot be presumed to have abrogated them
silently.266 The doctrine of the implied right of action is at present an un
settled common law principle,267 let alone one that could have been
known in its present form in 1871.268 For these reasons, the preoccupation with explicit congressional intent in the implied right of action context should not be hastily imported to the § 1983 context to require that
only Congress can create that kind of privately enforceable right.
Ultimately, the argument that because only Congress can create an
implied right of action, only Congress can create a right enforceable under § 1983 is dangerous because it ignores its own premise-that congressional intent is the touchstone. To pretend that § 1983 was enacted in
its original form to require specific and precise congressional intent to
create the right is to presume congressional intent to include a require-

262. See Recent Cases, supra note 36, at 740.

263. Id.
264. Berzon, supra note 41, at 540-41.
265. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 492 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring).
266. Id.
267. See Bellia, supra note 239, at 851 ("the Court's current approach [to implied rights of
action] lies in some tension with historical practice"); Berzon, supra note 41 (noting that, beginning
in the 1970s, the Court restricted the implied right of action by narrowing the range of factors to be
considered in determining whether a remedy existed from several to the single question of whether

Congress specifically intended to permit suits in federal court, thereby "abandoning any independent
judicial role of ensuring redress for violation of federally-created rights.").
268. See Bellia, supra note 239, at 839-48 (describing the historical common law precedents of

the implied right of action, its transition in America after code pleading was developed, and concluding that contrary to a superficial reading of the cases before the merger of law and equity, "it is inac-

curate to describe judicial practice before merger as creating remedies for the violation of statutorily
created rights.").
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ment in addition to those spelled out in the statute, something which is
269
not to be done lightly.
Instead, a more appropriate inquiry might be what the forty-second
Congress thought about regulations. For example, one can argue that,
although the authority to promulgate regulations has been delegated
since the founding of this nation, 270 the forty-second Congress did not
envision the vast expansion of the modem regulatory state in the postNew Deal era. However, the quality of some regulations to carry the
force of law has been recognized since 1845.271 Given the principle that §
1983 is to be liberally construed to further its purpose 272-which was to
codify the Marbury maxim273-it would seem more likely than not that
the forty-second Congress contemplated the meaning of the phrase "and
laws" that it inserted in the predecessor to § 1983274 and meant it to
"mean what it says, 275 that regulations having the force of law could be
enforced with the statute.
Assuming that the Supreme Court or a lower court takes into consideration the foregoing thoughts, the bigger question is whether, as a
matter of constitutional law, agencies have or should have the power to
create individually enforceable rights. This question is actually one of
delegation, since everything agencies do is pursuant to statutory grants of
authority. In the following excerpt from Sandoval, Justice Scalia described the current Court's apparent position toward the creation of individual federal rights by holding that only Congress can wield the power
to do so: "[a]gencies may play the sorcerer's apprentice, but not the sorcerer himself. 276 Although he was speaking in the implied right of action
context, the question is at the heart of whether agencies can create rights

269. Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005).
270. The First Congress granted military pensions "under such regulations as the President of
the United States may direct." Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322

(2000) (citing 1. Stat. 95 (1789)).
271. Gratiot v. United States, 45 U.S. 80 (1846); United States v. Freeman, 44 U.S. 556, 567
(1845) (army regulations sanctioned by the executive have the force of law). See also United States
v. Mora, 97 U.S. 413, 417 (1878) (bond regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury
have the force of law). Mora was, of course, decided after the 1871 enactment of the predecessor to
§ 1983, but for the proposition the Court cited Gratiot, which dealt with army regulations, and apparently considered the precedent to be generally applicable to all regulations. Today, it is widely
understood that validly enacted legislative regulations have the force of law. See Save our Valley v.
Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 954 (9th Cir. 2003).
272. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700-01 (1978) ("there can be no doubt that

[the predecessor to § 1983] was intended to provide a remedy, to be broadly construed, against all
forms of official violation of federally protected rights.").
273. See Berzon, supra note 41, at 541-42.
274. See supranotes 210, 213.
275. See supranote 213.
276. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001).

2006]

Killing Jim Crow & the UndeadNondelegation Doctrine

951

enforceable under § 1983. Just what kind of "sorcery" is right-making,
and to what extent may or should agencies exercise it? Is it the kind of
power that must be exercised by Congress alone, lest the constitutional
sin of legislative delegation be committed?
IV. NONDELEGATION AS A NONISSUE: AGENCY CREATION OF RIGHTS
ENFORCEABLE UNDER

§ 1983 DOES NOT

VIOLATE THE DOCTRINE

27 7

vests legislative power in
Article I, Section I of the Constitution
the Congress, and the negative implication is that such power may not be
delegated to any other branch.2 78 At least two commentators have argued
that right-making is most probably a legislative activity, and therefore, it
is not properly delegable to administrative agencies.279 But this argument
is weakly supported because the definition of legislative activity taken

from INS v. Chadha280 begs the question of what legislative activity is.281

277. "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
278. The basic premise of the doctrine is an application of the common law agency maxim to
the grant of legislative power in Article I, Section 1. The maxim is "delegata potestas non potest
delegari," or "a delegated authority cannot be delegated; a delegated power cannot itself be delegated." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1713 (8th Ed. 2004). However, although the concept of limits on
the congressional delegation of authority has earlier roots, see, e.g., Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. I
(1825), Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892), it was not associated with Article 1, Section 1, in a U.S.
Supreme Court decision until the petitioners in J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.
394, 404 (1928), argued that authority had been impermissibly delegated in violation of that section
of the Constitution. The doctrine of nondelegation was not concretely linked with Article I, Section
1, as a matter of constitutional law by a Supreme Court holding until the only two cases in which it
has been used to strike down a statute: Panama Ref Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), and A.L.A.
Schecter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
279. See Davant, supra note 36, at 635-41; McKennett, supra note 36, at 209-15.
280. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). In determining whether a one-house veto was unconstitutional delegation, the Court held that the test for whether activity is legislative is whether it "contains matter
which is properly to be regarded as legislative in character and effect." Id at 952. The Court then
elaborated on this broad definition by identifying two factors that were dispositive in its decision that
the one-house veto was "legislative activity": (1) it had the purpose or effect of altering the legal
rights, duties and relations of persons outside the legislative branch, and (2) it involved a determination of policy that Congress can implement only by bicameral passage and presentment to the President. Id. at 952-54.
281. The primary holding in Chadha is entirely tautological: "legislative activity is activity that
is legislative." Moreover, the Court's elaboration of this definition with its factors is not helpful
either because they are likewise overbroad. Applied to the activities of various branches of govemment, it would appear that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court itself in cases like Brown are
"legislative activity" because they alter the legal rights, duties, or relations of persons outside the
legislative branch and involve determinations of policy. Likewise, the Attorney General's authority
to criminalize the manufacture, possession, or distribution of various drugs under the Controlled
Substances Act, or to change the penalties associated with those acts for certain drugs, would undoubtedly be an important policy determination that has the purpose and effect of altering the legal
rights, duties, and relations of persons outside the legislative branch; however, a constitutional challenge on nondelegation grounds to this activity was rejected in Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160,
167 (1991).
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In all fairness to the Chadha Court, the task of defining the nondelegation doctrine is not an easy one. Accordingly, the question of
whether legislative power has been unconstitutionally delegated nearly
always becomes one of degree that strains judicial competence.2 82 Thus,
the first problem with the discussion of delegation in the context of regulatory rights-creation is the problem with discussion of delegation in
general. Due in large part to the doctrine's dubious constitutional legitimacy, 283 there is a healthy debate about the doctrine's viability in general,284 let alone whether or not it precludes creation of individually enforceable rights by federal agencies. Part A of this section traces some of
this debate and places regulatory rights-creation in a nondelegation context that is cognizant of the current state of the doctrine. Part B then suggests an analytical framework for judicial assessment of whether regulations that create privately enforceable rights are reasonable constructions

of their enabling statutes.
A. The Clich is Dead
Probably the greatest clich6 in all of constitutional law is that of the
nondelegation doctrine's "death. 2 85 However, some commentators argue
that although the doctrine fell into disuse after Schechter Poultry286 and
Panama Refining Co.,287 the pendulum has swung back with Whitman v.
American Trucking Associations, Inc. 288 and the conventional nondelega282. See generally., John F. Manning, NonlegislativeRules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 89495, 901 (2004); Sunstein, supra note 270, at 326-28.
283. See generally SOTIRIOS BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF
CONGRESSIONAL POWER, 11-51 (1975); Sunstein, supra note 270, at 322-23, Eric A. Posner &
Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1722, 1727-30
(2002).
284. See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 283; Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash,
Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine's Death are Greatly Exaggerated,70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297
(2003) (responding to Posner and Vermeule); Posner & Vermeule, Nondelegation: A Post-Mortem,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1331 (2003) (responding to Alexander and Prakash's response); David M. Wagner, American Trucking: The "New NondelegationDoctrine" Is Dead (Long Live the Old One?), 11
U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 25 (2003); Richard D. Cudahy, The Nondelegation Doctrine: Rumors of its
ResurrectionProve Unfounded, 16 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 1 (2002); Sunstein, supra note
270; David M. Driesen, Loose Canons: Statutory Construction and the New Nondelegation Doctrine, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (2002).
285. The many varied uses of this metaphor to discuss the doctrine and its utility suggests that
many legal scholars might have had as much success in post-graduate literary studies. See supra note
279. See also Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 330-32 (2002)
(characterizing the doctrine as the "Energizer Bunny" of constitutional law that keeps on going and
going, although any "any rational observer would have issued a 'code blue' long ago.").
286. A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
287. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
288. 531 U.S. 457 (2001). American Trucking overruled the D.C. Circuit, 175 F.3d 1027
(1999), which held that the Clean Air Act (CAA) unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The D.C. Circuit reasoned that the agency's interpreta-
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tion doctrine may be rising from the ashes. 289 Professor Sunstein argues
that instead of dying off, the nondelegation doctrine has "merely been
renamed and relocated, 290 to a set of nondelegation canons. 2 9 ' These
canons, he contends, are an essential and useful feature of public law
which ensures that certain rights and interests will not be compromised
without sufficient congressional involvement. 292 Professors Posner and
293
Vermeule, on the other hand, urge complete disposal of the doctrine.
They stress its constitutional pretensions 294 and declare that any executive agent engaging in rulemaking pursuant to a statutory grant of authority is exercising executive, not legislative power.29 5 They assert that the
conventional nondelegation doctrine is merely a metaphor to describe
grants of authority that deliver too much discretion to agencies.296 In any
event, the very unsettled state of the doctrine makes it difficult to say
with any certainty that it prohibits agencies from creating individually
enforceable rights as a matter of constitutional law.
Whether or not one takes the somewhat extreme position of Posner
and Vermeule on nondelegation, the view of nondelegation as a metaphor is probably the most intellectually honest way to consider it. Although the values meant to be served by the nondelegation doctrine are
tion of the Act's mandate to set National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) at levels "requisite to protect the public health" with an "adequate margin of safety," 42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(1), rendered the Act's delegation of that authority unconstitutional because EPA did not state intelligibly
how much was too much with respect to the emissions. Id. at 1038. It then remanded to EPA so that
the agency could cure the constitutional defect by developing a determinate standard. Id. Writing for
the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia stated that the Court has "never suggested that an agency can cure
an unlawful delegation of legislative power by adopting in its discretion a limiting construction of
the statute," but nevertheless held that the statute was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. 532 U.S. at 472, 474-76. For a round-up of the considerable amount of commentary that
both decisions sparked, see Cudahy, supra note 279.
289. See Wagner, supra note 284, at 25, 29-30.
290. Sunstein, supra note 270, at 315.
291. Professor Sunstein identifies three categories of nondelegation canons: (I) those that
promote constitutional goals, such as the rule against allowing agencies to construe statutes in a such
a way as to raise constitutional doubts and the rule against allowing agencies to construe statutes to
preempt state law; (2) sovereignty-inspired canons, such as the rule that agencies cannot apply statutes outside the territorial borders of the United States and the rule that agencies cannot construe
statutes unfavorably to Native Americans; and (3) perceived public policy canons, exemplified by
rules that preclude agencies from making policy decisions against widely held social commitments,
such as the narrow constructions of income tax exemptions and the presumption against allowing
agencies to defeat the general federal policy against anticompetitive practices. Id. at 331-35.
292. Id. at 337-39.
293. See Posner & Vermeule, supranote 283, at 1724-25.
294. Id. at 1723. The professors explain their "naive view" of delegation beginning with the
claim that the problem ofjudicial competence has resulted in a "guilt complex of constitutional law,"
and they "offer a course of therapy that will relieve constitutional law of its neurotic burden by
showing that the Constitution just doesn't contain any nondelegation principle..." Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1726-27.
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concededly of the utmost importance, 97 it is recognized by most that
"Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power
under broad general directives., 298 And the sky has not yet fallen despite
the fact that legislative power is delegated to the executive and to independent regulatory agencies as a matter of course. 99
Early recognition of the reality that legislative authority is routinely
delegated to administrative agencies helped develop the debate on another level: the "old" doctrine versus the "new." The "old" nondelegation
doctrine is the traditional prohibition on any congressional delegation of
legislative power; the "new" nondelegation doctrine is a reformulated
approach in which the constitutionality of a statutory delegation of authority rests on whether the agency's interpretation of it contains adequate standards with which the agency effectively guides its own action. 300 However, the "new" doctrine did not really take hold 30 1 and was

arguably repudiated by the Supreme Court's holding in American Trucking.3 0 2 Moreover, self-imposed limiting interpretations may not further
the highly important goal of political accountability 30 3 while at the same
30 4
decreasing the flexibility that agencies need in order to be effective.
297. Justice Rehnquist stated in his concurrence in The Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v.
Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (the Benzene case) that the three purposes of the nondelegation doctrine are: (1) "it ensures to the extent consistent with orderly governmental administration
that important choices of social policy are made by Congress, the branch of our Government most
responsive to the popular will," (2) it "guarantees that, to the extent Congress finds it necessary to
delegate authority, it provides the recipient of that authority with an 'intelligible principle' to guide
the exercise of the delegated discretion," (3) "and derivative of [(2)], the doctrine ensures that courts
charged with reviewing the exercise of delegated legislative discretion will be able to test that exercise against ascertainable standards." Id. at 685-86. Other commentators have identified the purposes as political accountability, separation of powers, and the protection of individual liberty by
way of increased legislative transaction costs. See Sunstein, supra note 270, at 317-20.
298. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
299. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 757-58 (1986) ("it is well settled that Congress
may delegate legislative power to independent agencies or to the Executive, and thereby divest itself
of a portion of its lawmaking power..."); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 984 (1983) (White, J.,
dissenting) ("legislative authority is routinely delegated to the Executive Branch, [and] to the independent regulatory agencies..."). One can say that the formulation of generally applicable prospective rules that are binding and carry the force of law is not lawmaking but rather "agency interpretation," "gap-filling," or the delegation of "policy-making authority." However, slips of the judicial
tongue and the functional analysis seem to make those who refuse to acknowledge that agencies
wield lawmaking power look like ostriches burying their heads.
300. See Mark Seidenfeld & Jim Rossi, The False Promise of the "New" Nondelegation Doctrine, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2 (2000); Wagner, supra note 284, at 30-38. Both authors cite as
the source of the "new" doctrine Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, who argued in the 1960s and 1970s
that agencies should be given broad delegations of legislative authority, but should confine their own
discretion by providing self-limiting standards.
301. Seidenfeld & Rossi, supra note 300, at 7.
302. See supra note 288; Wagner, supra note 284, at 38.
303. Seidenfeld & Rossi, supra note 300, at 12-13. The professors argue that this is so given
the empirical evidence that the public does not engage in discussion about the value choices underly-
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It is for these reasons that Professors Seidenfeld and Rossi favor judicial review of an agency rule after the interpretation of the statute has
been made.3 °5 Judicial review of agency rulemaking that utilizes various
canons of construction, including the Chevron doctrine, is very effective
at limiting the scope of congressional delegation. 30 6 Indeed, Chevron operates in the same way the "new" nondelegation doctrine would, upholding exercises of agency discretion if they are reasonable.30 7 Chevron is
thus, in a very real sense, a better answer to the problem of delegation for
two reasons. First, unlike the "old" nondelegation doctrine, it is judicially
enforceable because it is principled analysis rather than an arbitrary "Iknow-it-when-l-see-it" approach to grants of excessive discretionary authority. Second, unlike the "new" doctrine, it is meaningful, after-the-fact
review of agency action that neither sacrifices accountability or flexibility, nor places an agency in the position of exercising the discretion that
is forbidden in the first place.30 8
One answer to the nondelegation problem and to the question of
agency creation of rights enforceable under § 1983, then, is reliance on
Chevron-inspired canons of interpretation that address particular types of
delegated lawmaking authority. They would allow agencies' flexibility in
rulemaking to address the specific factual issues that necessitate the
delegation of legislative authority in general 30 9 and those that perpetuate
institutional racism. 310 Indeed, a few commentators have already proposed contextualized Chevron applications as a better approach to the
nondelegation problem.3 ' Professor Zellmer argues for a very reasoned
alternative to strict nondelegation review based on Chevron that synthesizes that rule's deference to agency interpretation with the "hard look"
ing agency decisionmaking, but rather cares only about the "bottom line acceptability" of the actual
rules. Id. at 12. Because of this, the "new" nondelegation doctrine would have an agency set its own
limiting standards with a binding interpretation of the enabling statute which may be consistent with
public values in one situation but inconsistent with public values in the next. Id. at 13-14. In this
way, political accountability is decreased because the agency is nevertheless committed to a previous
interpretation that is not consistent with the public's values. Id.
304. Seidenfeld & Rossi, supra note 300, at 15-16. The professors explain that, because constraints of any kind on agency discretion which are set before any exercise of that discretion are
necessarily imperfect, an agency's adoption of binding interpretation can easily become defective by

discovery of additional factors that are relevant in applying a statute. Id.
305. See generally id.
306. Cudahy, supra note 284, at 19.
307. Id. at 17.
308. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001) ("The very choice of
which portion of the power to exercise-that is to say, the prescription of the standard that Congress
had omitted-would itselfbe an exercise of the forbidden legislative authority.").
309. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
310. See supra Section II.
311. See, e.g., Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st Century
Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 1014 (2000).
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review of agency action first set out in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park
v. Volpe, 312 and proposes tiered review of statutory delegations contextualized with reference to the implications of the subject matter.31 3 Likewise, the following section proposes a reasoned alternative to a conclusory determination that agency creation of a § 1983 right violates the
nondelegation doctrine. Instead, courts should undertake a particularized
application of the Chevron doctrine to a regulation purporting to create
such a right, one that is contextualized with reference to the values underlying § 1983 jurisprudence.
B. Chevron Review TailoredSpecifically
to § 1983 Regulatory Rights Creation
Admittedly, an argument that is partly descriptive but also partly
normative about the nondelegation doctrine is a large premise on which
to rest a smaller argument for a proposed method of analysis. But the
nondelegation doctrine is so unsettled and unworkable3 14 that any decision that agencies lack the power to create rights enforceable under §
1983 would be an arbitrary one, and the current state of the doctrine does
not provide the answer at present anyway. Moreover, although the argument that agency rulemaking that has the effect of creating such rights
are unreasonable and therefore not entitled to Chevron deference 315 may
be supported by recent Supreme Court decisions restricting the scope of
Chevron,316 another recent decision may suggest the opposite trend,3 7
and there are many unresolved questions about what kinds of rules Chev318
ron deference should apply to.
Nevertheless, one could argue that, whether under the traditional
nondelegation doctrine or under a Chevron analysis, the power of federal
agencies to create rights enforceable under § 1983 is simply a bad idea
because it gives too much discretion to agencies. Perhaps it is one of
those "important choices of social policy" that only Congress should
make. 31 9 The potential for disruption of economic and other expectations
and activities that private enforcement creates may be something that
312. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
313. See Zellmer, supra note 311, at 998-99. She proposes a higher level of scrutiny for stat-

utes that pose dangers of overreaching, factionalism, or abuse of discretion, and a lower level for
other statutes, used simply to ensure principled, unbiased agency decisionmaking.
314. See supra notes 282-89 and accompanying text.
315. See Davant, supra note 36, at 644.
316. See Mank, supra note 36, at 874.
317. Id.
318. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J.
833, 849-52 (2001) (identifying 14 concrete unresolved questions in addition to theoretical questions about the scope of Chevron).
319. See supra note 297.
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federal agencies should not be allowed to create. Private enforcement
also may risk over-enforcement and therefore over-deterrence of useful
and efficient activity. 320 However, these objections are really support for
the contrary position: the issues are highly specific factual questions that
Congress is not capable of addressing. 321 For example, in the context of
regulations mandating nondiscriminatory school site selection, 322 private
lawsuits may risk interference with a public enforcement scheme that is
better equipped to secure consistent compliance, 323 and if so, the risk
might be outweighed by the inability of an agency to overcome political
pressure, inadequate funding, or other obstacles to enforcement,3 24 such
that private enforceability is necessitated. Such inquiries would most
fairly and effectively be conducted by agency rulemaking procedures,
which allow for the most meaningful public participation by all affected
parties. 325

Indeed, this is the very type of analysis that Congress intends agencies to undertake when it issues broad directives with gaps that agencies
must fill. Giving full effect to congressional intent that agencies effectuate such directives requires agencies to consider how best to do so, which
sometimes results in proscriptive regulations. In this sense, if an agency
did decide to create rights enforceable under § 1983, it would not have
the effect of subjecting local governmental actors to any greater liability
than they are already; it would only allow agencies to calibrate compliance levels to effectuate the will of Congress. This Comment proposes
simply that when Congress expressly delegates the authority to make
rules carrying the force of law, then the creation of rights enforceable
under § 1983 should be a policy decision made by the agency. 326 An at320. See Stephenson, supra note 29, at 114-16.
321. Id.at 106-07. Professor Stephenson explains:
[T]he desirability of authorizing private actions involves difficult policy judgments and is
likely to depend on a number of context-specific factors . . . [t]hus, when considering
how to allocate authority over private enforcement policy, an institutional designer must
take into account the capacity of various decisionmakers to trade off a host of complex
advantages and disadvantages within a particular substantive context, as well as the incentives such decisionmakers are likely to face.
Id.
322.
323.
324.
325.

See supra notes 155-60.
See Stephenson, supra note 29, at 117-19.
Id. at 110-12.
Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20

CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 781 (1999).

326. During the editing of this Comment, Professor Stephenson published his article "making
the case" for private enforcement which makes this argument in the context of implied rights of
action, and is extremely helpful in this area because it succinctly sets out the advantages and disadvantages to private enforcement generally. Stephenson, supra note 29, at 106-20. Specifically, Professor Stephenson argues that in the implied rights of action context, the Supreme Court should
abandon its insistence on specific congressional intent to create a private remedy and instead treat a
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tempt to privately enforce regulations that create such rights should precipitate judicial review of the reasonableness of the regulations that is
tailored precisely to the issue of private enforcement under § 1983.
Thus, when a duly promulgated agency regulation 327 satisfies the §
1983 rights-creation standard and thus creates a privately enforceable
right, a reviewing court should engage in a Chevron style analysis. The
first step should be similar to the first step of Chevron, i.e., whether
Congress has spoken to the issue of rights creation.328 If Congress has
prohibited the creation of rights enforceable under § 1983, then the regulation obviously cannot create rights and it can be enforced only through
enforcement methods not foreclosed. Likewise, Congress may constrain
an agency's authority to create rights by requiring the agency to conduct
a cost-benefit analysis 329 through which the agency must balance the alternatives of public, private, and hybrid enforcement schemes. This requirement would constrain agency authority to create privately enforceable rights unless they are cost-effective.
If Congress has not precluded the creation of rights enforceable under § 1983, and has not constrained agency discretion by a cost-benefit
analysis requirement (or if the regulation at issue satisfies that requirement), then the reviewing court should apply a Chevron second step and
ask the general question of whether the regulation that purports to create
rights under § 1983 rights is reasonable. 330 However, the rights-creation
context requires an elaboration of that inquiry with factors relevant to
both § 1983 jurisprudence and administrative policy-making in general.
The creation of a right enforceable under § 1983 should be reasonably necessary to effectuate the underlying statutory objective. Regulations, if they are to be valid, must be reasonable constructions of the

statute that is ambiguous on that score as an implied delegation of authority to the agency to determine whether a private right of action is desirable. Id. at 95-96. Professor Stephenson also notes his
proposal's intersection with § 1983 jurisprudence and suggests that his proposal counsels in favor of

recognizing agencies' ability to create rights enforceable § 1983 as well. Id. at 163-66.
327. Agency regulations must of course comply with the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 500 (2005). For example, Section 553(c) of the APA requires that rules adopted contain a
"concise general statement of their basis and purpose." Many statutes are also more specific as to the
support that agencies must produce for the rules they have adopted. See, e.g., The Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7607(d)(6)(C) (2005) ("the promulgated rule may not be based (in part or whole) on any
information or data which has not been placed in the docket .... ").
328. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
329. See, e.g., Am. Textile Mfr's Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (the Cotton Dust case)
(citing the Flood Control Act of 1936, 33 U.S.C. § 701, and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Amendments of 1978, 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b), as support for the proposition that when Congress in-

tends agencies to engage in cost-benefit analysis, it makes that intent clear in the language of the
statute).
330. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
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enabling statute, 331 but given the Supreme Court's recent heightened emphasis on congressional intent in the rights-creation context,33 2 it only
makes sense that such a regulation must be not only reasonable, but reasonably necessary to achieve the statutory goal. Raising the reasonableness bar in this way for regulations that purport to create privately enforceable rights incorporates the important value of congressional intent
as feature of § 1983 jurisprudence in the sense that, given the importance
of congressional intent, the authority to create such rights should not be
presumed where it would not be reasonably necessary.333 This approach
could also be understood as the strictest form of Chevron review in Professor Zellmer's framework.334
In deciding whether a right enforceable under § 1983 is reasonably
necessary, the court should consider the balance of the advantages and
disadvantages of private enforcement, 335 and whether the agency has
struck the right balance under a substantial evidence standard. The court
should consider whether the likelihood of greater and more efficient enforcement, overcoming agency slack, and the desirability of various innovations in approaches to enforcement outweigh the risks of excessive
enforcement or interference with public enforcement schemes that may
be more efficient under the circumstances without private intervention.
The comprehensiveness of any alternative enforcement scheme, a
factor which in § 1983 cases rebuts the presumption that a right has been
created,336 should serve as a reference point in this assessment, playing
its role as a rebuttal fact a little bit differently than usual. A fairly comprehensive alternative enforcement scheme would be evidence of agency
slack if, historically, violations are documented and enforcement is limited. If so, the balance tips in favor of a finding that privately enforceable
rights are reasonably necessary. On the other hand, if the alternative enforcement scheme is comprehensive and documentation does not demon-

331. Id.
332. See supra Part IlI.B.
333. This is so because Chevron is itself a presumption as to congressional intent. See Smiley
v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996) ("We accord deference to agencies under
Chevron, not because of a presumption that [agencies] drafted the provisions in question, or were
present at the hearings, or spoke to the principal sponsors; but rather because of a presumption that

Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood
that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency

(rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows."). Therefore,
the explicit intent language used by the Court in Sandoval and Gonzaga suggests that the presumption should operate only where it would be reasonably necessary to achieve the statutory goal.
334. See supra notes 311-13, and accompanying text.
335. See Stephenson, supra note 29, at 106-20. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs
and PrivateRights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1289-15 (1982).
336. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997).
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strate agency slack, then this weighs against a finding of reasonable necessity.
Applied to Title VI, this analysis, however potentially useful, does
not necessarily yield an easy answer. This is so because the "tension"
between Title VI and its implementing disparate impact regulations,3 37
may lead some courts to conclude that this proposed analysis is precluded in the first instance. Because Title VI has been held to prohibit
only intentional discrimination, some courts might find that disparate
impact regulations do not serve the same statutory goal or are not reasonably necessary to serve that statutory goal. 338 However, to the extent
that the regulations have been held valid, reasonable constructions of
Title VI, 3 39 this "hiccup" in Title VI jurisprudence does not preclude
analysis of whether particular Title VI regulations or future regulations
are supported by substantial evidence sufficient to demonstrate that their
private enforceability is reasonably necessary to serve the statutory goal.
Generally, however, the time and expertise that agencies can bring
to bear on complex issues suggests that they will be more sensitive to the
intricacies of injustice-that they will in many instances be able to identify and proscribe conduct that would not otherwise have been identified
as responsible for institutional racism. Furthermore, there is no principled reason why agencies cannot exercise the power of rights-creation
effectively and responsibly, and a conclusion that they cannot risks abandoning effective tools that could bring us closer to eradicating racial
discrimination. Therefore, it is time to recognize federal administrative
agencies as "journeymen" in the job of calibrating compliance with federal anti-discrimination standards, not as mere "apprentices" without the
authority to act. In this way, courts and agencies can demonstrate their
"partnership in furtherance of the public interest ...[as] collaborative

instrumentalities of justice 340 by bringing principled judicial review of
expert agency attention to bear on lingering racial inequality.
V. CONCLUSION

The war against racial injustice has not been won in America, but
rather the battleground has shifted to an institutional setting. Institutional
racism, however, is much more difficult to identify and combat because
337. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 282 (2001).
338. Since regulations "forbid conduct that [the enabling statute] permits." Id.at 285.
339. See Mank, supra note 219, at 519 ("the Supreme Court has indicated in several cases, at
least in dicta, and arguably in language deserving precedential value, that agencies may promulgate
regulations, pursuant to section 602 of Title VI, that prohibit practices creating unjustified discriminatory effects ... however, the Supreme Court may soon reject section 602 disparate impact regulations.").
340. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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the conditions producing it are often complex. In the context of education, for example, nuanced issues such as the effect that school site selection and attendance zones have on communities of color were recognized
by the Supreme Court in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education.
These factual issues are important to address so that institutional racism
in the form of school segregation can be prevented, but challenges based
on these circumstances can no longer be brought in federal court in many
places because desegregation orders are being terminated. This unfortunate gap in the law is mirrored to some extent by HUD regulations that
address housing discrimination, but which are ineffective because they
cannot be privately enforced and federal oversight and enforcement is
lacking.
It is clear that federal administrative agencies have the time and expertise to address the specific factual circumstances responsible for institutional racism. In fact, some of the regulations already enacted under
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act specifically address the examples
of school segregation and housing discrimination herein provided. These
regulations, if privately enforced under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, could go a
long way toward achieving the goal of true racial justice in America, and
the continued refusal to allow them to be enforced is a distressing example of what Judge Berzon calls the "uncoupling" of rights from remedies.
Moreover, if agencies used the power of rights-creation responsibly, they
could very effectively target institutional racism in a way that has not
heretofore been achievable.
However, courts are averse to recognizing agency creation of rights
enforceable under § 1983. This is clear from the case of Save our Valley
v. Sound Transit, which exemplifies both the factual need for regulatory
rights-creation as well as the error in refusing to recognize that power on
the part of agencies. It may be that the Supreme Court has held that implied rights of action can only be created by Congress, and that the first
step in determining whether a statute has created an implied right of action is the same as determining whether a statute creates a right enforceable under § 1983. However, there are important differences between
implied rights of action and § 1983 that preclude the inferential leap that
only Congress can create rights enforceable under § 1983. Most importantly, § 1983 does not require a finding of congressional intent to create
a private remedy, which is the overwhelming focus of the doctrine of
implied rights of action. Instead, § 1983 is specific congressional intent
to afford a remedy for any deprivation of rights secured by federal law,
and it is to be broadly construed. For these reasons, a more considered
analysis of whether agencies can and should create rights privately enforceable under § 1983 should be undertaken.
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The primary argument against agency rights-creation, the undead
nondelegation doctrine, provides no basis for arguing that it is something
only Congress can do. Although the doctrine was recently reaffirmed, it
is so unsettled and unmanageable that it is clear to many that the real issue of delegation is addressed by canons of construction that contemplate
the important values served by the metaphor of nondelegation, but realistically focus on controlling the discretionary lawmaking authority that is
routinely delegated to administrative agencies. In this sense, the Chevron
doctrine is a valuable tool in constraining this discretion, and a variation
of it should be used to review agency rules that purport to create rights
enforceable under § 1983. Such a Chevron-inspired canon of construction would require a reviewing court to first consider whether rightscreation exceeds the authority given to an agency by the enabling statute.
If the statute expressly prohibits the creation of rights privately enforceable under § 1983, or if it impliedly constrains agency power to do so,
then the rule purporting to create § 1983 rights is invalid. If, on the other
hand, there is no preclusion, then the court should move to the second
step and ask whether the regulation is reasonable. This general question
should be elaborated in the rights-creation context to consider whether
privately enforceable rights are reasonably necessary to effectuate the
statutory goal in light of specific evidence and the efficacy of alternative
enforcement mechanisms.
Recognition of the reality of institutional racism and the attributes
of the modern administrative state strongly suggest that administrative
agencies ought not to play "apprentice" to Congress in the context of
rights-creation in order to ensure achievement of statutory antidiscrimination goals. Rather, they should operate as "journeymen," exercising the power to create rights responsibly, but with adequate supervision that constrains their discretion appropriately.

